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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The National Violence Against Women Survey (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000), 
conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice, estimated that more than 200,000 
women over age 18 were raped by their intimate partners (i.e., boyfriend or 
husbands) over the 12-months prior to their survey, with an estimated 1.6 rapes 
committed per person (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). Females are an estimated eight 
fi mes more likely than males to be assaulted by an intimate partner (Greenfield, et 
x1.,1998; McFarlane, Willson, Malecha, & Lemmey, 2000). Other studies have found 
that 14% to 25% of all rapes are committed by an intimate partner (Bergen, 1996; 
Russell, 1990). And while men, too, are raped, an estimated 95% of all rape victims 
are women (Dusky, 1996). Of course, these statistics are not extremely reliable as the 
crime is woefully under reported. Rape, especially all forms of acquaintance rape, is 
likely the least reported and prosecuted crime of all (Benedict, 1992; Dusky, 1996; 
Russell, 1990). 
Statistics are just the first layer. The crime itself is only the first part of a 
painful chain. Beyond that lies the physical and psychological scars inflicted by 
rape. Russell's (1990) study found that long-term effects of wife rape, or the rape of 
wives by their husbands, range from constant fear to overwhelming anger to 
complete emotional breakdowns. She also agued that wives raped by their 
husbands suffer as much or more trauma than women raped by strangers or non- 
intimates. And then, if the crime is reported to the police, unsolicited public 
attention and possibly a trial soon follow (Dusky, 1996). 
In trials for most crimes, the suspect is placed under the public's microscope, 
both interpersonally and through the mass media. "Is the suspect really guilty?" 
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"What was his/her motive and was it justified?" But in rape trials, including those 
of wives against husbands, there are two suspects under investigation: the 
suspected assailant and the alleged victim. Often the victim's history (sexual and 
otherwise), personality, and motives are under as much scrutiny as those of the 
suspect. If she also happens to have killed or wounded her assailant, the scrutiny is 
often multiplied (Dusky, 1996). 
Possibly no other crime victim is as publicly ridiculed and disbelieved as the 
rape victim. If a man is robbed at gunpoint at 2:00 a.m. in New York City, few will 
ask, "Why was the victim out so late anyway? Doesn't he know it's dangerous for a 
man to be out alone at that time?"; "What was he wearing that attracted the robber 
to him?"; "Are we sure this man didn't secretly want to be robbed that night? We all 
know some men are violent and actually like to be attacked with a gun and robbed." 
Yet, the public often puts similarly ridiculous questions to rape victims, casting the 
validity of the accusation, the victim, and the crime itself, into doubt. 
It is this common public doubt cast upon the victim's story that is a primary 
obstacle in bringing rapists to justice (Dusky, 1996). Two interrelated questions lead 
to the issues this paper will investigate, focusing specifically on the topic of rape 
within marriage: 
• How is gender ideology maintained through the discourse about wife rape? 
• How do the words contained in the media reflect society's gender structure? 
Judging by the statistics (Greenfield, et a1.,1998; McFarlane, Willson, 
Malecha, & Lemmey, 2000; Tjaden 8~ Thoennes, 2000), it is not difficult to believe 
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that most people in this country have been or know someone who has been raped, 
either by a stranger or an acquaintance. But by those same statistics, it may be 
believed that many people do not know that they know a rape victim. The silence of 
most victims often extends not only to the police and media, but also to their friends 
and families (Bergen 1996; Finkelhor & Yllo, 1985; Russe11,1990; Schwartz, 1997). As 
such, public opinion about rape likely comes predominantly from an outside, 
impersonal source; the news media seem a likely outlet for these opinions. 
Unforhznately, studies show that the news media are, often unintentionally, 
not objective or thorough enough in their coverage of rape crimes (e.g., Benedict, 
1992; Meyers, 1997). As content analyses have shown, coverage of rape crimes 
varies according to the class and race of the victim, and news stories often use 
derogatory, sexist, and racist vocabulary in descriptions of both the crime and the 
victim (e.g., Benedict, 1992; Meyers, 1997). If this coverage truly represents the 
primary source of information on rape for the general public, there is little wonder 
why misperceptions about rape persist. 
However, commentaries in newspapers, such as letters to the editor, staff-
written editorials, and syndicated columns and occasionals, have not been studied 
to determine whether they are equally biased against women who report rape. 
Could these popular forms of mass communication, because of their close 
association with "objective" news stories, impart a biased interpretation of meaning 
that affects public opinion about wife rape? Few, if any, content analyses about rape 
coverage in the media have adequately investigated the role of commentaries in 
shaping the meaning, values, and opinions about the crime. 
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This research will not duplicate the established findings about news coverage 
of rape and rape trials, but instead will focus on the commentaries that appear in 
relation to the news. In addition, as mentioned previously, the particular 
commentaries and commentaries chosen will focus on the issue of wife rape. 
Benedict's book Virgin or Vamp: How the Press Covers Sex Crimes (1992) 
includes four content analyses of nationally covered rape crimes and subsequent 
trials. First studied was the 1978 Rideout case, the first firial of a husband accused of 
raping his wife while still living with her. The case brought the issue of wife rape to 
the national agenda. Multiple controversies surrounded the case, including whether 
a husband could rape his wife, whether Greta Rideout actually consented to sex then 
changed her mind (a frequently used argument in many rape trials, especially when 
the victim and assailant know each other) (Dusky, 1996), and whether the 
government should be involved in marital sexual relations at all. 
Despite the controversies, after the trial and over the following 20 years, wife 
rape laws were passed in x1150 states (Bergen,1996; Russell, 1990). Without the 
national media coverage of the Rideout trial, it is hard to imagine the concept of wife 
rape making it onto the public agenda, let alone changing the laws concerning 
sexual violence against women. 
Beyond the law changes, however, little has improved the plight of women 
raped by their husbands since the Rideout case. Many women hesitate to report the 
crime for different reasons, including perceptions that the public is not supportive, 
that husbands still have a right to their wife's body, that the courts will not uphold 
the wife's right to sexual autonomy (Bergen, 1996; Russe11,1990). 
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Through discourse analysis of commentaries related to the issue of rape 
within marriage, this study will shed additional light on the potential influence of 
the media on public definitions and opinions of wife rape. Through an examination 
of opinion-based newspaper content, this study will contribute to the data already 
available on news reporting on rape, shedding additional light on how public 
opinion about wife rape is established. 
Through awareness comes change. The results of this and other studies can 
help improve the sensitivity and objectivity of reporters and other journalists who 
write about all kinds of rape, including wife rape. If the media do have an effect on 
public opinion, the findings of this study could help lead to more responsible 
attention to the sensitive issue of rape, allowing women to come forward and report 
the crimes against them without fear of public ridicule and scorn. 
Rape is not a crime of sex; it is a crime of violence. The media can and should 
be accurate in disseminating information about all crimes against all people, 
regardless of the nature of the crime, and the race, class, and gender of the criminal 
and victim. Through critical studies like these, it can happen. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Victims of Wife Rape 
For the purposes of this research, the crime of rape committed by a husband 
on his wife will be called "wife rape." This term is interchangeable with more 
common terms, such as "marital rape" or "spousal rape." But, in agreement with 
Russell (1990), the term wife rape removes the gender neutrality of the other terms, 
placing more emphasis on the fact that women are eight times more likely to be 
sexually assaulted by an intimate partner than are men (Greenfield, et al., 1998). 
Although this is in no way an attempt to minimize the instances of sexual assault 
against men, that aspect of abuse is not within the scope of this study. 
Legal Issues in Wife Rape 
Before examining the effects of wife rape, a brief examination of the legal 
issues surrounding the topic is necessary. Rape laws in most states include sex by 
force, by threat of force, or when the victim is unable to consent because she is 
drugged, unconscious, asleep, or in some other way helpless (Bergen, 1996; Russell, 
1990). Until the 1970s, x1150 United States included a "wife rape exemption," which 
made the prosecution of a husband who raped his wife impossible (Russe11,1990). 
This exemption was based on the writings of 17th century English Chief Justice 
Matthew Hale who said: 
But the husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by 
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind 
unto the husband which she cannot retract (quoted in Russe11,1990). 
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This pronouncement and the laws it inspired led to a legal standard of the 
wife as property of her husband. Rape laws were designed not to protect women 
from assault, but men from the defamation of his property, namely his wife and 
daughters (Bergen, 1996; Hasday, 2000). Kirkwood &Cecil (2001) called this policy 
"the equivalent of sexual slavery for women." 
First-wave feminists in the late 19`~ century fought against the laws based on 
the assumption that women were property of their husbands, including wife rape. 
They considered wife rape to be a common and powerful method for men to 
subjugate women. Some degree of success was attained as instructional literature of 
the day spoke out against wife rape, though only in the context of husbands 
voluntarily avoiding raping their wives. Husbands were told this avoidance would 
benefit him as well as his wife, suggesting that if husbands were not willing to 
withhold for their wives, then they should do it for themselves (Hasday, 2000). This 
was hardly a full victory, but for feminists the attention was a step toward 
recognizing the harm of wife rape. But as feminist efforts turned to suffrage in the 
early 20 x̀' century, issues such as wife rape became less prominent within the 
feminist circles (Hasday, 2000). 
Nearly 250 years after Matthew Hale, and a century after the early feminists 
brought wife rape to public attention, the laws began to change, reflecting the efforts 
of the women's movement of the 1970s to recognize the rape of wives by their 
husbands (Russell, 1990). By the late 1990s, x1150 states eliminated the wife rape 
exemption, though many states continued to allow some exceptions to the law, 
allowing rape against wives and intimates under certain conditions, until very 
recently (Bergen, 1996). For example, unti12001, Iowa law allowed a husband to 
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rape his wife when she was unable to consent because she is mentally or physically 
impaired, unconscious, or asleep (Iowa General Assembly, 2001; Iowa General 
Assembly, 2003). 
In addition to the exemptions and lingering exceptions, other prejudices have 
repressed the rights of wives to charge their husbands with rape. The Model Penal 
Code, developed by the American Law Institute and followed by many states 
(Estrich,1987; Hasday, 2000), minimizes the severity of rape cases if there is a 
history of sexual relations between the assailant and the victim. This has an obvious 
effect on raped wives, as it is assumed that consensual sexual relations exist in most 
marriages. The Code's stance on wife rape has recently been criticized, but its 
impact on the courts continues to linger (Hasday, 2000). 
In her book Real Rape Estrich (1987) also makes the distinction between simple 
and aggravated rape. Simple rape is sexual assault without the use of physical force 
by someone the victim knows, or by someone who does not beat her or attack her 
with a weapon. Aggravated rape is committed by a stranger or multiple men 
(strangers or acquaintances) or is forced by beatings or the use of weapons. In many 
jurisdictions, conviction for wife rape depends on criteria that would meet 
aggravated rape standards if the relationship between assailant and victim did not 
restrict it to a case of simple rape, which is harder to convict (Estrich, 1987). 
Another issue that works against the victim in the legal definition of rape is 
the concept of "force," which is required to prove a case of rape. In the 1980s, force 
replaced the former "consent" measurement, which focused on how strongly the 
victim resisted the attack. The consent standard was highly prejudiced against the 
victim as she was required to prove her innocence through physical resistance to an
9 
attack by a man who may be much stronger than she is. She then relied on the 
courts to believe that her fight against the attack was as strong as she could manage 
(Estrich,1987). 
The force measurement, according to the Model Penal Code, was intended to 
focus on the acts of the assailant. The change, however, frequently does not help the 
victims of wife rape, as this type of rape is considered a simple rape. In simple rape, 
force is not prohibited in and of itself, but only force that completely overcomes 
female nonconsent, thus still defining force in terms of the strength of the woman's 
resistance (Estrich, 1987). As will be seen in the discussion of Russell's (1990) study 
of wife rape, wives often do not physically fight against their husbands' attacks for 
fear of further violence or because they are resigned to what they see as inevitable. 
In cases like this, force may not be used in the rape, so that in court, the force 
measurement does not help the victim, but may in reality hurt her. It focuses on 
what the victim did not do, not on what the assailant did (Estrich,1987). An 
example of this argument's weakness is a 1984 case in North Carolina that 
determined a woman was not raped by her ex-lover because, while the sex was 
certainly not consensual, there was no force involved (Estrich,1987). 
There are two modern arguments in favor of legal wife rape exemptions, 
including the right to individual privacy and the promise of marital reconciliation 
(Eskow, 1996; Harvard Law Review, 1986; Hasday, 2000). The right-to-privacy 
argument often invokes the 14`~ Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
prevents the government the right to infringe on individual property. Namely, this 
argues for the right of a married couple, or a husband, not to have the law "in the 
bedroom." The second argument is that the wife rape exemption allows a married 
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couple to work out the problems in the marriage without criminal law interfering 
with their efforts. It is argued that when the courts get involved, any hope of 
reconciliation will be dashed (Harvard Law Review, 1986; Hasday, 2000). 
The Victims of Wife Rape 
The previously mentioned 1984 North Carolina court case of a woman 
against her former lover leads to a discussion of the victims of wife rape, how they 
view the assaults against them, how they survive the attack, and how they decide 
whether to charge their husbands with rape. 
Perhaps the most in-depth study on the effects of wife rape was conducted in 
1978 by Diane E. H. Russell and published in her 1982 book Rape in Marriage (second 
edition published in 1990). The study was conducted by interviewing 930 women in 
San Francisco about their experiences of sexual abuse. The open-ended questions 
allowed women to interpret for themselves whether their experiences of sexual 
abuse at the hands of their husbands were rape. Interviewers sent letters to 
participants' homes, asking if the women were willing to be interviewed. With each 
woman's consent, the interview took place in the woman's home, giving as much 
opportunity for her to discuss her experiences. After the interview, participants 
completed questionnaires asking questions about their ability to answer inquiries 
completely and honestly, and how they felt about the interview (Russe11,1990). The 
sample of participants excluded those in institutions, shelters, and other places 
where the concentration of abused women would be disproportionate to that of the 
general public (Russe11,1990). 
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The resulting qualitative and quantitative analyses of the interviews 
concluded that 14% of women in the study who had been married had an experience 
with their husbands or ex-husbands that qualified as rape under the legal definition 
(Russe11,1990). 
Of the 644 women in the sample who had been married, 87 women reported a 
total of approximately 980 attempted or completed rape by their husbands, 
including reports of repeated assaults (Russell, 1990). The next highest relationship 
that resulted in a rape or attempted rape was that of a lover or ex-lover with 344, 
fewer than half the number of assaults by husbands. Asian women reported the 
fewest number of rapes or attempted rape, followed by Latina, then white women. 
Black women reported the highest number of rapes or attempted rapes by their 
husbands, though the difference between white and black women is not large. 
Almost two-thirds of the women reported that the rape occurred when they were 
between the ages of 19 and 25, another one-third were between ages 26 and 40 
(Russe11,1990). 
Only 7% of those women whom Russell considered to have been raped by 
their husband acknowledged that they were victims of rape or attempted rape 
independent of the interviewer's inquiries. The question of whether they had been 
raped was asked before asking further about assault experiences by their husbands. 
Russell argued that this low number may be a sign that women were initially 
unwilling to discuss the assaults by their husbands, or that they assumed the 
interviewers were not looking for that kind of experience (Russe11,1990). 
The study's limitations lie in the small sample (930 women) relative to the 
national population, and in the small area in which the study was conducted. 
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Kirkwood &Cecil (2001) argue that these same limitations make their data 
impossible to generalize to the wider U.S. population. In the book Researching Sexual 
Violence Against Women (1997), Currie &MacLean argued that victimization studies 
like Russell's assume that women will be willing to disclose instances of sexual 
violence. This assumption, they said, is perhaps not warranted, especially given the 
fact that women often do not even report sexual violence to the police (Schwartz, 
1997). Russell (1990) acknowledged these limitations in Russell's (1990) book, but 
argued that the statistics are relatively accurate on a national scale. In using San 
Francisco for her survey, Russell pointed out that the rape statistics per 100,000 
women in 1978, according to the Uniform Crime Reports, were not significantly 
different from many other demographically similar cities, including Dallas, Boston, 
and Cleveland (Russe11,1990). Through afollow-up questionnaire,most 
respondents in her study reported that they felt fairly comfortable reporting the 
whole truth to the interviewers. Although it is impossible to know for certain how 
truthful the participants were, Russell (1990) believed enough questions were asked 
and clarifications made during the interview to make as the study as valid as 
possible. 
Other studies, conducted very sporadically over the years, report not vastly 
different statistics. The National Crime Victimization Survey reported that eight of 
every 1,000 women were physically and/or sexually assaulted by a current or 
former husband or boyfriend, compared to one out of every 1,000 men. These 
statistics were based on a random sample of 100,000 women nationwide (Greenfield 
et x1.,1998). As stated in chapter one, the National Violence Against Women Survey 
(Tjaden & Thoennes , 2000), conducted by the U.S. Departrnent of Justice, roughly 
13 
estimated that more than 200,000 women were raped by an intimate partner in the 
year prior to their survey. Finkelhor & Yllo (1985) found that 9% of women who had 
been married or who had cohabitated reported forced sexual contact with their 
husband or partner. Among those in the survey who were divorced, the total was 
21%. 
All of these studies (Finkelhor & Yllo, 1985; Greenfield, et x1.,1998; Russell, 
1990; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000) provide only estimates of the real numbers of 
victims. Russell noted several reasons why any of these numbers could be, and 
probably are, inaccurate. First, it is impossible to interview women who were 
murdered by their husbands. As will be shown later, there is a correlation between 
wife rape and wife battering, which can lead to murder. Another cause for 
inaccuracy is the fact that women who are battered and raped may end up in 
women's shelters, out of the reach of researchers conducting random sample 
surveys as has been discussed above (Russell, 1990). 
Another important aspect of wife rape is its association with battering. Not 
all women who are raped by their husbands are also battered, and not all battered 
women are raped. But in 21% of the marriages in the Russell (1990) study, wife rape 
and battering occurred in approximately equal proportions. In comparison, in 23% 
of the marriages, rape was the primary abuse, and in 54%, battering was the primary 
abuse (Russe11,1990). Finkelhor & Yllo (1985) outlined three types of rape, including 
"battering rape," which comprised the largest portion of rapes or attempted rapes in 
marriages. Bergen also sites other studies that have found that wife rape occurs 
more often in physically violent marriages (Bergen, 1996). 
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Stermac, Del Bove, &Addison (2001) conducted a survey of rape victims and 
found that wife rapes and date rapes involved nearly an equal amount and level of 
physical and verbal threats and abuse and resulted in a similar number of injuries. 
Boyfriends were found to use slightly more physical aggression and significantly 
more often used weapons to rape girlfriends than were husbands. The researchers 
suggested that this may be because wives are less likely to resist an assault than 
girlfriends. 
Emotions and Reactions 
Statistics only show so much. The real strength of Russell's (1990) study is its 
qualitative, affective nature. Much of the text in her book is quoted directly from the 
women interviewed, telling stories of sexual and physical abuse by their husbands. 
Interviewers asked participants what their level of trauma had been as a result of the 
rape or attempted rape. Her data revealed that 56% of the women claimed they 
were "extremely upset" by the incident; another 39% said they were either "very" or 
"somewhat upset." No woman said it did not upset her at all. As far as long-term 
effects, 49% said it had a great effect on their lives; 28% said it had some effect; l4% 
said little effect, and only 9% said it had no long-term effect. These statistics closely 
match those of women who were raped by strangers (Russe11,1990). 
Bergen (1996) outlined the physical effects of wife rape, in addition to the 
emotional. She references a 1989 study by Campbell &Alford that lists 
miscarriages, bladder infections, and vaginal stretching as common physical effects. 
Emotional effects included anxiety, depression, and thoughts of suicide (as cited by 
Bergen, 1996), which were contemplated by two of the women in Russell's study 
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(1990). It is impossible to know how many women succeeded in killing themselves 
without reporting wife rape, and what effect their inclusion would have on the 
statistics had they not died. 
This certainly does not imply that the situation is inescapable. In Russell's 
study (1990), 78% of the women who were raped by their husbands were no longer 
married to their abusive husbands (either due to divorce, separation, or the death of 
the husband). Several factors play a role in whether a woman stays in her abusive 
marriage, including her economic status independent of her husband, how 
traditional her views on marriage are, and how she defines the abuse. Bergen (1996) 
said that women who define the situation as rape are more likely to leave because 
women who do not see the situation as rape are more likely to minimize the trauma 
and severity. The more economically independent and "non-traditional" she is, and 
the more she is able to classify the assault as rape, the more likely the woman is to 
leave the situation (Bergen, 1996; Russe11,1990). 
Unfortunately, however, not all women leave, and there is no easy 
demographic categorization of the women who stay. In Russell's (1990) study, 45% 
of the women who stayed were upper-middle class. Bergen (1996) found that 
women raped by their husbands or ex-husbands were more likely to leave than were 
battered women. More independent, "modern" women were no less vulnerable in 
Russell's (1990) study, but as discussed earlier, they were more likely to take direct 
action to prevent fixture assaults. 
A common reaction to assault among those who stay is self-blame. Russell 
(1990) cited a study by Irene Frieze (1979) who found that women blamed 
themselves in situations of their own rape by their husband, but in hypothetical wife 
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rape situations, the same women tended to blame the husband. Similarly, Bergen 
(1996) found that, once removed from an abusive relationship, women are more 
likely to place the blame on their husband or ex-husband, but women who stay 
often develop a "learned helplessness." Russell (1990) used this phenomenon, 
originally suggested by psychologist Lenore Walker, to explain why some women in 
her study stayed in their abusive marriages. Learned helplessness implies that some 
women sense a lack of control in the marriage after beatings or rape, which after a 
time turns the abuse into a kind of reality or normality, leading them to passivity. 
Bergen (1996) took a more individualized approach to explaining why women stay, 
suggesting that each woman who stays develops her own coping mechanism to live 
with the experiences) of sexual abuse. 
Only nine women in Russell's (1990) study reported the assault to the police. 
In each of the cases, the women who did report were among the most severely 
abused of all interviewees. This did not bring instant relief, unfortunately. When 
the women reported the assaults) to the police, they often stated that they later 
regretted it. One possible reason for this is that, at the time of the survey, wife rape 
was not illegal in California. Bergen's (1996) more recent study found about 80% of 
the women who had reported assaults by their husbands to the police were 
unsatisfied with the inadequate response and lack of respect they experienced. 
Critiques of Wife Rape Studies 
Not everyone is convinced, however, that the problem of wife rape is as 
serious as Bergen (1996) and Russell (1990) report. Critics of the feminist movement, 
such as Christina Hoff Sommers and Katie Roiphe, have criticized rape studies for 
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exaggerating the problem and promoting a "victim feminism." In her book Who 
Stole Feminism? Hoff Sommers (1994), author of several books about gender issues in 
American culture, criticized the portrayal of rape as a gendered crime because it 
misses the true nature of the crime, which she argued is merely the gratification of a 
criminal with little thought to the suffering inflicted on victims. She also argued that 
rape is not a sexist crime, but one against the person; women are just one 
subcategory of the problem of rape. To prove this, she pointed to other, more 
patriarchal countries around the world that have fewer cases of rape and violence in 
general. 
In a New York Times Magazine article, Roiphe argued that "victim feminists" 
such as Russell promote a "utopian vision" of sex without power, pursuit, or 
struggle. She argued that the inclusion of verbal coercion in rape laws would have 
to include any negative sexual experience a woman has (as cited in Hoff Sommers, 
1994). 
The criticism of these two authors, along with noted critic of feminism, 
Camille Paglia, promote a more active resistance to rape instead of focusing on the 
victimization of women at the hands of men. However, what these authors fail to 
add to their criticism is a constructive, helpful alternative for women. In Feminism: 
Opposing Viewpoints, Denfeld (2001) suggested that women fighting back against 
rape is not far removed from the inadequate laws that focus on "consent" and 
"force" as a means to blame the woman. How do these critics define "fighting back" 
and how do they suggest wives, or any woman, fight against an assailant who may 
be significantly larger or who is wielding a weapon? Without a plausible 
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alternative, these criticisms lack a solution that will end violence against women 
(Hurley, 2001). 
Society, Culture, and Public Opinion 
Research has shown that the trauma of wife rape is comparable to, and often 
exceeds, the trauma of stranger rape (Bergen, 1996; Finkelhor & Yllo,1985; Russell, 
1990; Stermac et al., 2001). Because of the low reporfiing rates it is impossible to 
know how prevalent or severe these incidences are (Bergen 1996; Finkelhor & Yllo, 
1985; Russe11,1990; Schwartz, 1997). According to a study cited in Russell's (1990) 
book, the United States has significantly more rape crimes per 100,000 women than 
any other western country. This study includes rape by strangers and other 
acquaintances as well as spouses, but the prevalence of wife rape reported in the 
various studies would suggest that the number of cases of wife rape may be higher 
than the number of other types of rape cases. 
Public opinion on wife rape in the United States does not match the high 
number of assaults that occur every year. In addition to the voices of critics of 
feminist views of rape, public opinion is decidedly contrary to the statistical 
evidence of the prevalence and seriousness of wife rape. Kirkwood &Cecil (2001) 
list two different classifications of surveys generally used to measure public 
perception of wife rape. Some studies focus directly on wife rape, asking 
participants about specific rape scenarios and their perceptions about them. The 
second kind of study works with crime more generally, asking participants to rank 
the seriousness of a series of crimes, including wife rape. 
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According to Kirkwood &Cecil (2001), Gordon & Riger conducted a study of 
the first kind in 1989 that found that 64% of men and 63% of women did not 
consider unwanted sex between a husband and wife as rape. Kirkwood &Cecil 
(2001) conducted their own survey of 469 undergraduate students and found rape 
within marriage, while considered a negative action, was considered a much less 
serious crime than other kinds of rape. The survey provided scenarios that 
concerned different relationships between the assailant and victim (i.e., stranger, 
acquaintance, date, spouse), nature of the assault (i.e., no consent, physical force, or 
both), type of penetration (i.e., vaginal, oral, anal, or digital), and object of 
penetration. Stranger rape was considered the most severe, ranking 3.9 on a scale of 
one to four (four being most severe); wife rape ranked 0.55 on the same scale, an 
indication of the low level of severity attached to this crime. Two similar studies by 
Candice Monson and colleagues (1996 and 2000) found similar minimization of wife 
rape, as did Simonson & Subich (1999). 
Langhinrichsen-Rohling &Monson (1998) also found that participants in their 
study made fewer rape-supportive attributions (those that minimize the seriousness 
of rape) to a scenario of wife rape when it was in the context of a physically violent 
relationship. They made the most rape-supportive attributes when there was no 
given history of physical violence. This study suggests that wife rape is more 
believable when other violence is present in the marriage. 
In addition, all these studies found a significant difference in wife rape 
minimization between male and female participants. In the Kirkwood &Cecil 
(2001) study, 81% of women believed that sex involving no consent should be 
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considered rape, while only 68% of men thought the same. In scenarios involving 
physical force, 95% of women and 91% or men believed the attack was rape. 
Auster &Leone (2001) conducted a study of fraternity and sorority members 
and found that fraternity members were significantly less likely than sorority 
members, as well as non-fraternity male students, to classify marital sexual assault 
as rape. Fraternity members also were significantly less likely to favor legislation to 
make wife rape illegal than both sorority members and non-fraternity male students. 
No such difference was found between sorority members and non-sorority female 
students. The researchers suggest several possible explanations for fraternity 
members views on wife rape, including fraternities' socialized objectification of 
women, participants trying to "live up" to perceived beliefs of the other members, 
and common prior beliefs influencing decisions to join the fraternity in the first place 
(fluster &Leone, 2001). 
The second kind of wife rape study, as categorized by Kirkwood &Cecil 
(2001), is the generalized rating of crimes. In the case of rape, wife rape has been 
found in studies to rank lower than any other kind of rape. In a study by Finkelhor 
& Yllo (1985), participants ranked "forcible rape of a former spouse" number 62 on a 
list of 140 crimes, meaning they considered it less serious than selling marijuana and 
stealing. 
In a voluntary survey in 1980, psychologists Malamuth, Habur, & Fesbach 
questioned 53 male volunteers about an acquaintance rape scenario. The 
participants were asked to rate on a scale of one to five whether they would have 
acted similarly to the assailant under the situation described in the story. A total of 
51% of the participants said they would act in the same way if they were assured 
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they would not be caught. In another similar study, john Briere found that 60% of 
their all-male sample said they would rape a woman under the "right" 
circumstances (as cited in Russe11,1990). 
It seems, judging by these studies, that many Americans do not believe a 
husband can rape a wife, but in reality that has not been found to be true as such. 
Some men believe they have a right to rape under certain conditions, as the 
Malamuth, Haber, & Fesbach study (1980) shows (as cited by Russe11,1990). People 
are complicated beings, and full of contradictions. Although people consider wife 
rape less serious than other kinds of rape (a belief that has been all but proven 
inaccurate by the studies on victims cited in the first part of this chapter) (Bergen, 
1996; Finkelhor & Yllo,1985; Russell, 1990), a majority of people appear to believe 
that rape of a wife is, at the very least, undesirable. In a dissertation study in 1985, 
Jeffords found that 75% of respondents to a mail survey said that a woman has a 
right to refuse sex with her husband, and 90% considered forced sex by a husband 
as undesirable (as cited in Finkelhor & Yllo, 1985). Finkelhor & Yllo (1985) 
conducted a similar study in Boston and found that 69% of respondents said a 
woman had a right to refuse sex, and 72% agreed that the term rape should apply to 
situations where husbands physically force sex on their wives. 
These statistics can be taken in limited context only. In many of the studies, 
samples were voluntary participants, and in all cases they were limited in number of 
respondents. In addition, these few studies were conducted at wide time intervals, 
suggesting that the topic has received faltering attention, due to the limited number 
of studies over the years. They do, however, provide an insight into how people 
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might think about wife rape, and provide a basis for interpreting media information 
and public discourses on the subject. 
Sex-Role Socialization Theory 
Monson et al. (1996 and 2000) suggest the use of the sex-role socialization 
theory of rape in considering how public perception of wife rape is developed. The 
theory (originally developed by Burt in 1980), suggests that, from childhood, males 
and females develop certain expectations of what is acceptable behavior for their 
gender. Males and females cultivate, through living in a certain culture, the sex-role 
ideology of that culture. Schramm (1973) said a person's way of seeing reality is a 
product of being socialized into a culture and learning to accept its custom and 
views of the world. Perception is often an active process and what an individual 
perceives often depends on what the individual thinks and wants to see (Condon, 
1975). 
Wife rape, then, is the sex-role ideology taken to an exfireme. People's 
acceptance of rape within marriage may depend on how they adhere to the gender 
ideology of their culture. Strong adherents, either male or female, would be more 
likely to promote rape-supportive cultural beliefs such as blaming the victim or 
placing more seriousness on stranger rape than acquaintance or wife rape (Monson 
et x1.,1996 and 2000). Studies cited above concerning public perception of wife rape 
suggest that men and women participate in sex-role ideology practices; both genders 
showed a tendency to minimize wife rape, though women were less likely than men 
to do so (fluster &Leone, 2001; Gordon & Riger,1989; Kirkwood &Cecil, 2001). 
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The important counterpoint to the sex-role socialization theory is that while 
our perceptions of the world are largely based on memberships in various "groups" 
(e.g., male versus female) (Schramm, 1973), reality is simultaneously a very 
individualized process. Behavior is a process of bringing both culture-wide 
expectations and individualized experiences, and in each situation, the prevalence of 
one over the other will vary. In largely society-wide constructs, such as race, 
gender, and economic class, perceptions are more easily led by cultural influence. 
Alternatively, perceptions of family and occupation may be understood in a more 
individual, experiential way (Condon, 1975). 
Because wife rape is often seen in the media as a gender issue, and because 
perceptions are based less on experiential evidence than on cultural ideological 
standards, sex-role socialization theory can be used to help understand the apparent 
contradiction found in the studies cited above concerning the relative severity 
differential between stranger and wife rape, and the difference of attribution of 
severity between men and women. 
An important aspect of sex-role ideology is history (Monson et x1.,1996 and 
2000). The laws that governed rape through history, including the consent standard 
and wife rape exemptions, continue to be part of our culture in practice if not in law, 
and are possibly related to the commonly held beliefs shown in the studies. 
Common myths associated with wife rape can be attributed to traditional 
perception of gender roles. A prevalent myth is that women are obligated to 
provide sex for husbands even though they have inadequate sex drives; interrelated 
is the perceived right of husbands to have sex on demand. Similarly, there is a myth 
that a marital license is a legal contract for sex (Eskow,1996). Another interrelated 
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cultural ideology is that of the ideal marriage. Marriage is considered a sacred, 
blissful (if imperfect) state; any actions or situations that contradict this ideal are not 
easily accepted and some live in denial of this reality (Hasday, 2000). These myths 
are commonly held by men and women, and are perpetuated through culture, both 
interpersonal and in the media. 
But how are these sex-role ideologies maintained in a mass culture such as 
the United States? Communication, both interpersonal and mass, is a common and 
universally accessible means of teaching and promoting certain ideals within society 
(Schramm, 1973). The purpose of this study is to combine mass and interpersonal 
communication by studying the public discourse in editorial media outlets. How is 
gender ideology maintained through the discourse about wife rape? How do the 
words contained in the media reflect society's gender structure? By examining how 
gender is portrayed in the media, it may be possible to find ways of developing 
discourses that are more representative and positive of both men and women (Mills, 
1995). 
Sex Roles and Language 
Linguistic determinism argues that because our thoughts, emotions, and 
identities are based on word descriptions, language actually determines reality 
(Mills, 1995). From this perspective, some feminist linguists suggest that the 
inherent sexism in language has created the social reality of gender difference and 
inequality (Cameron, 1992). The perspective of this thesis is that language does not 
cause gender, nor does it cause gender ideology. Language reflects society and 
gender ideologies, and through reflecting, it maintains the status quo, as is 
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consistent with Cameron's (1992) theory of the construction of language and gender. 
Language was not created in a cultural vacuum, and language users are no more 
isolated from culture than the language itself. Factors of gender, economic class, 
and race are all important determinants of in the development and maintenance of 
language. Sexism in language, then, is not a cause, but a symptom (Mills, 1995). 
As sex-role socialization theory suggests, people live their lives from birth 
learning what it means to be one gender or the other, and how that meaning 
determines social reality. Language is one element that both describes and explains 
these meanings and determinations. Schramm (1973) said that "culture is to 
language as an individual's personality is to communication." In short, what is said, 
and how it is said, reflects how the speaker thinks about the reality of what is said. 
Even when speakers believe their words are based on their own emotions, Mills 
(1995) argued that these emotions are nonetheless a product of socialization as much 
as individual choice. 
Moreover, the definitions of what is "masculine" and what is "feminine" are 
shaped not by strict and unchanging differences, but by the cultural perceptions and 
dichotomies that the words imply. If there were no cultural definition of 
"femininity," there would be no definition of "masculinity." And by extension, 
then, "masculine" would not equal "strong," and "feminine" would not equal 
"weak" (Cameron, 1992). Then, too, what would "feminist" mean if there were no 
connotations, dichotomies, and polarities...would there even be "feminism?" 
In terms of gender and sex-role ideology, certain forms of language use and 
vocabulary similarly reflect the importance of cultural norms of identity and gender 
structure (Condon, 1973) . How a language names things is symbolic of how it f eels 
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about the cultural impact of those things and words, and the descriptions given by 
words have an impact in developing and shaping what they describe. 
Etymologically speaking, language development and usage has reflected the 
importance of certain concepts. Common examples include the many words for 
different kinds of snow in the Inuit language versus no words for snow in languages 
from South America. At one time, Arabic had multiple words for different kinds of 
camels. These words reflected the need for language to express the complexities of 
everyday living for its speakers. Therefore, what is valued most in a society will be 
reflected in the vocabulary of its language (Condon, 1973; Mills, 1995). 
Even the arguably objective definitions in a dictionary can reflect the often 
prejudiced views of their authors and society (Mills, 1995). This can be seen in the 
differences in definition of the word coed, which the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (Nish, et x1.,1997) defines as (in the context of naming a person) "a 
student and esp. a female student in a coeducational institution." The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Soukhanov, et al., 1993), however, 
defines the same word in the same context as "a woman who attends a 
coeducational college or university." One dictionary completely rules male students 
out of the definition, whereas the other merely suggests that the word is used 
primarily in reference to female students. Because both dictionaries define 
coeducation as the education of both genders, why, then, is the word coed only or 
primarily used for females? 
Feminist linguists point to the use of "marked" and "unmarked" words that 
suggest male primacy and normalcy. A word that is "unmarked" is considered the 
standard, and when the word becomes "marked," it is then nonstandard (Cameron, 
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1992). For example, the word doctor is unmarked compared to the colloquial lady 
doctor, which suggests that doctor unmarked means male and must be modified (or 
marked) to mean otherwise. Mills (1995) gives an example of the use of a 
problematic unmarked noun. Ina 1990 book called Empire and Sexuality, the author 
discussed circumcision in America, concluding that "at the beginning of the 1970s 
more than 90%o of Americans were circumcised at birth." The unmarked word 
"American" in this sentence suggests that the word describes men instead of all 
Americans of any gender (as cited in Mills, 1995). 
Another example of marking is the phrase female chairman, which is 
dangerous both for being marked and using the generic male to describe both 
genders. The generic male is used when both genders are referred to in a singular 
tense where "they" is not appropriate. Linguists and grammarians have long 
argued that there is no sexism in the use of the generic male, that its use is merely 
one for grammatical accuracy and simplicity. But feminists argue that this usage is 
often sexist if not by literal interpretation then by connotation, because it leads to 
suggestions of masculinity. Mills (1995) gives an example of how the use of generic 
male is problematic because our connotative sense of the word is masculine: "Man is 
a mammal which breastfeeds its young." The use of "man" in this sentence seems 
wrong because only women breastfeed their children, yet it is correct, according to 
traditional grammar. 
Journalists are increasingly aware of the use of the generic masculine in news 
stories. In her book Unbiased: Editing in a Diverse Society, Wisner-Gross (1999) 
devotes a chapter to eliminating gender bias in the print media, and specifically 
refers to ways to avoid unnecessary use of the generic masculine, suggesting the 
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word "humanity" instead of "man" to reflect all human beings, and "synthetic" in 
place of "manmade." Similarly, the Associated Press Stylebook (Goldstein, 1996), a 
guide used by most American newspapers, suggests that "man" or "mankind" may 
be used when other terms are inconvenient, but recommends using non-gendered 
terms such as "humanity," "person," or "individual" wherever possible. This 
awareness of non-sexist style shows that newspaper editors are concerned with 
treating women and men equally in their articles. 
As socialized beings, humans have a tendency to live up to the labels given 
them. Thus, when children are told "girls are nurturing" or "boys don't cry," it may 
be aself-fulfilling prophecy. Responding to labels gives a person a sense of 
collective identity and belonging, and will help make decisions regarding behavior 
easier (Condon, 1973). When these attitudes and behaviors are then described as 
"natural", there is considerable evidence to support it. Little thought is given to 
how or why these behaviors came to be or whether these behaviors may be merely a 
reaction to hundreds, even thousands, of years of human socialization (Condon, 
1973). Any inconsistencies, when completely ingrained in collective consciousness, 
may be hidden from view by the labels' power. Stereotypes in our language, and 
hence our culture, will persist as long as there are gender inequalities. 
Simultaneously, as long as we keep using verbal labels of gender identity, there will 
continue to be gender inequalities. 
Language also is fluid. The labels used continually change, if not in meaning, 
then often in connotation. For example, at one time, the word girl meant a child of 
either gender (Condon, 1973; Schulz, 1975). The word mistress, too, used. to refer 
only to the woman in charge of a household, but now has an entirely different, and 
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negative, connotation (Cameron, 1992; Schulz, 1975). The context often changes, as 
well. Words used to label race have moved in the last 40 years from connotations of 
biology (e.g., the biological superiority of whites over blacks) to connotations of 
sociality (e.g., the inaccurate yet persisting image of welfare recipients as young 
black mothers) (Condon, 1973). 
The language choices of speakers play a large role in interpretation, but 
language users such as readers are also an important factor in the meaning of 
language. The socialization of readers is similar, in style and degree, as that of 
speakers. Readers make choices in deciphering what a speaker intends, and the 
connotation of the words used in discourse (Mills, 1995). But even this 
interpretation, while part of the individual psyche, may often be an element of the 
socialization of that individual. A woman may interpret words as sexist because of 
her experiences with sexism and men in general, but she also maybe interpreting 
them as part of her understanding of what it means to be a woman. Readers have 
the choice of how to interpret words they hear and read, and also the ability to 
accept or reject them (Mills, 1995). The choice is not easily understood as a matter of 
all women reading a text one way, and all men another. Other factors, including 
race, politics, economics, and personal experience affect reader interpretations, but 
Mills (1995) argued that gender on some level is always a factor in reading and 
interpreting. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to study individuals' 
interpretations, these effects on people more generally are the reason for studying 
words at all. 
Information continually moves through a society, often through the mass 
media. But the voices in the media are a collection of individuals who are a product 
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of sex-role socialization. Commentaries in newspapers, through the open expression 
of opinions, provide an opportunity to examine a somewhat personal language 
structure of individuals on a mass level. This thesis considers the point that those 
who shape language use and construction are not necessarily those traditionally in 
positions of power. Cameron (1992} quoted linguist Trevor Pateman who said that 
too often semiologists and linguists overlook the ability of minority voices to affect 
lingual understanding. 
Wife Rape in fhe Media 
The development of sex roles in American culture is a complicated process 
involving family structures, friendships, and geography, as well as media exposure. 
Although it is difficult to argue that the media are solely or even primarily 
responsible for the development and maintenance of our culture's sex-role ideology, 
the view of this thesis is that it does play a role. 
Agenda setting is a mass communication theory about the role the mass 
media play in public perception and opinion. The theory argues that the media do 
not "tell people what to think, but what to think about" (McCombs &Shaw, 1972). 
In a later article, McCombs &Shaw (1993) said that, in addition to telling people 
what to think about, the media also tell people "how to think about it." In their 1972 
study on the agenda-setting effects of political communication in the media, 
McCombs &Shaw (1972) argued that the important messages of campaigns are 
distributed to the general public through the articles and commentaries found in the 
mass media, instead of through interpersonal communication with the candidates. 
This media-based means of communicating gives editors the responsibility to 
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determine which of the many political stories are important enough to publish. The 
agenda-setting process occurs when editors make that choice, thereby telling people 
"what to think about" (McCombs &Shaw, 1972). 
Framing is a related theory of mass communication effects that suggests each 
reader interprets a specific news story according to a broad range of individual 
experience, not solely on the article (McCombs, Shaw &Weaver, 1997). The mass 
media are one way in which individuals develop "frames,"which are cognitive 
collections of views on a topic (Scheufele,1999). McCombs, Shaw &Weaver, (1997) 
called framing "second-level agenda setting," meaning that framing is a form of 
agenda setting on an individual level instead of a mass audience effect. In other 
words, framing adds an element to the original agenda-setting concept: The media 
tell us what to think about as well as "how to think about it" (McCombs, Lopez-
Escobar &Lamas, 2000; McCombs &Shaw, 1993). 
The decision by newspaper editors whether or how much to cover the issue 
of wife rape during a trial or at any other time could have an agenda-setting 
function for the public. Most of the public will only know about wife rape from 
third-hand accounts, often through indirect means, such as the mass media. As 
Russell (1990) found, victims of wife rape tend not to tell others about their 
experience, even to family and friends, providing no means for the public to learn 
about the crime interpersonally. With the exception of syndicated columns and 
occasionals, opinion-page editors decide which commentaries to publish in much 
the same way news editors select their stories. The decision to publish any 
commentaries at all, as well as which specific viewpoints to publish, help shape 
public opinion, or set an agenda, about the issue. It is not the intent of this research 
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to examine editors' gatekeeping decisions on which commentaries about wife rape 
to publish, but it is important to remember the effect this has on how readers view 
wife rape. The number as well as the content of commentaries make an impact on 
how (and how much) readers think about the issue, and thereby how "important" it 
is. 
Kirkwood &Cecil (2001) hint to the possible effects of the media coverage of 
wife rape cases in swaying survey results by claiming that media coverage may have 
influenced how participants in their study responded to their questions. In an essay 
on "hate radio," Williams (1997) argued that, because of the social segregation and 
lack of historical knowledge in American culture, the media are the primary source 
of information about others in the culture. This, she said, results in the media's 
ability to promote passivity or hatred of other groups, including wives who are 
raped. 
Karpin (1997) said the media offer an interpretation of the law that does not 
always match the Iaw of the courts. The media, she said, presents the law in images 
instead of in the foundational truth of court decisions. She continued by pointing 
out the verbal imagery repeated in the media for the 1992 adoption case involving a 
baby who was taken hom her adoptive home and refiurned to her birth parents. In 
this case, the media frequently said the baby was taken from "the only home she's 
ever known," namely her adoptive parents' home. This phrase, Karpin argued, 
combined with the frequently shown images of the screaming baby being taken 
from her adoptive parents, set a certain public perception of the moral right or 
wrong involved in the case, despite the "objective" nature of the news. The point of 
Karpin's (1997) essay was not that the media always work for a dominant ideology 
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or that they are always good or bad, but that the media continually shift to meet the 
ideologies they see, thereby naturalizing those same ideologies into the culture. 
In an article about agenda-setting and AIDS in the 1980s, Rogers, Dearing, & 
Chang (1991) pointed out that most issues that garner media attention do so for a 
limited time, usually less than one month. Indeed, media coverage of wife rape has 
been sporadic, appearing mostly when a trial makes national news. Most prominent, 
perhaps, is the case of John and Lorena Bobbitt in 1993 and 1994 (Bergen, 1996). 
And while sporadic, the media attention has served to provide a social definition to 
the victims of wife rape, who before had few opportunities to learn that they were 
not alone and that what happened to them was not acceptable. In effect, it added 
legitimacy to the hurt and anger they felt (Bevacqua, 2000; Daly & Chasteen,1997). 
However, this reconstructed sex-role definition for women has not been 
without opposition. The media also have given ample attention to the victimology 
of men at the hands of these new anti-rape definitions. In her essay in Feminism, 
Media, and the Law, McCluskey (1997) discussed the effects of openly anti-feminist 
talk show host Rush Limbaugh and his rise to fame through stories of white male 
victimhood at the hands of feminism. McCluskey also pointed out the anti-feminist 
women's movement and its role in promoting the victimization of men. Roiphe's 
anti-feminist work on date rape, for example, was featured in several stories in the 
New York Times (as cited by McCluskey,1997). In a cover story in the magazine New 
Republic, Robert Wright claimed that the feminist anti-rape activists failed to 
consider the "sexual nature" of men and women, and that laws restricting this 
nature (the naturally aggressive male sexual nature), will only victimize both men 
and women (McCluskey,1997). These and other articles, McCluskey said, 
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exaggerate the rare false claims of rape against men by women who were confused 
by the feminist anti-rape movement. McCluskey (1997) and Williams (1997) both 
pointed out that most strongly anti-feminist media outlets are heavily viewed and 
read by white males. Williams (1997) cited a Time magazine story that reported 75% 
of radio host Howard Stern's audience were young white males. 
The media, then, provide divergent views on rape of all kinds. Newspaper 
commentaries, especially, can express any opinion. These opinions have the 
potential to promote and justify traditional sex-role ideologies demonstrated in the 
studies of wife rape and public perceptions of the crime. It is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to examine the direct causal relationship between the commentaries and 
public perception of wife rape, but agenda setting and framing theories are 
important reminders that the words under study here are read and understood on a 
personal level with readers. The words do not exist in a vacuum. 
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CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Discourse analysis is a qualitative means of examining texts to discover the 
meaning behind the words they contain. It examines the application of meaning 
that readers find in the text on the micro level. The application of meaning, then, is 
based on a more macro-level understanding of culture and its norms. Hodge & 
Kress (quoted in Mills, 1995) said that words are not enough in the analysis of 
meaning; in reading and watching texts through discourse analysis, the cultural 
norms, values, myths, and stereotypes are revealed (Meyers, 1997). Discourse 
resides somewhere between the text as it stands on its own and the culture as a 
whole (Jensen, 1995); it is a means of examining the choices speakers and writers 
make in both functional and formal terms (Cameron, 1992). 
A key component of discourse analysis is semantics, the study of how people 
respond to words and what those words symbolize (Condon, 1975). More 
specifically, semantics is the analysis of the connotative and interpretive meaning of 
words. In semantics, the distinction is made between the signifier and signified 
(deSaussure,1916). The signifier is the word itself and its dictionary definition; the 
signified is how the reader interprets and bases a connotative meaning of the 
signified or the symbols that represent the signifier (Jensen, 1995; Schramm, 1973). 
Signs are what we see or hear; symbols are how we see or hear them and how we 
react accordingly (Condon, 1973). 
The signified maybe somewhat elusive, as many symbols are thoroughly 
ingrained in our culture as to seem unquestionable. Words and symbols themselves 
do not cause misinterpretation. Indeed, words and symbols are a necessary part of 
human relationships and understanding. The danger in words and symbols lie in 
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their exaggerated view of reality and the often inflated importance placed on them 
by members of a culture (Condon, 1973). In addition, the difference in interpretation 
between each individual complicates the question of how words are signified 
(Schramm, 1973). Discourse analysis allows the researcher to combine the linguistic 
semantic analysis of text with analysis of the culture within and around the text. 
Another benefit of discourse analysis is that it takes into consideration the 
text that is not present as well as what is (Meyers, 1997). It is impossible to quantify 
the latent meaning of absent text, but discourse analysis provides a qualitative 
opportunity to include this text and its meaning within the context of the text that is 
present within the sample. For example, for this study, the low number of 
commentaries written about wife rape over the years is as significant as the content 
of the commentaries that were printed. 
Black &Coward (as cited in Cameron, 1992) encouraged feminists to 
concentrate on discourse instead of language (i.e., grammar or lexicon) because 
language itself is not inherently sexist. Language only becomes sexist when 
organized into discourse, when certain language choices are made to use words 
with sexist intentions. 
Tools for Analysis 
There are multiple tools to help proceed with discourse analysis, and the 
techniques used in this study depend largely on the nature of the texts found for 
analysis. Foremost in these techniques is a modern feminist linguistic perspective, 
chosen because of its tie to themes found in this analysis of wife rape coverage in the 
editorial media. In fact, a predominant theme in the commentaries analyzed here is 
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the association of wife rape activism with feminism. It is logical to utilize feminist 
linguistic techniques to understand discourse that is heavily dominated by feminist 
and anti-feminist rhetoric. There are divergent, and occasionally opposing, views of 
how to understand discourse; this analysis will not assume one "school" of linguistic 
thought but will use multiple areas of thought within feminist linguistics, including 
critical discourse analysis (Wodak,1997) and sociolinguistics (Wodak,1997; 
Cameron, 1992; Mills, 1995). These methods provide the framework for how the 
commentary texts are read and analyzed for sex-role ideology in practice. 
Three main steps will be used in analyzing the discourse of commentary texts 
(Mills, 1995): 
1) Determining the intention of the writer; 
2) Searching for the use of knowledge that the writer assumes the reader to 
know (e.g., the nature of feminine and masculine, or the positive or negative 
effects of modern-day feminism); 
3) Determining the inferences of the text, or what the writer is suggesting, either 
overtly or covertly. 
The purpose of discourse analysis, and this research project more specifically, 
is not to serve as a predictor of human behavior, or offer a full explanation of social 
sex-role ideology and pracfiice. The signs under examination do not directly cause 
behavior as such, but instead may produce a predisposition to act. As stated in 
chapter two, the contention of this thesis is that language is a reflection of culture and 
gender identity, not a cause. This discourse analysis undertakes to examine the 
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effects of media more broadly, to determine the role of the media in maintaining and 
perpetuating the meaning of cultural norms and ideologies. In this case, the analysis 
specifically will focus on how newspaper commentaries produce and perpetuate the 
sex-role ideology that prevents wife rape from being taken seriously compared to 
other forms of rape. Textual analysis of culture's discourse about realities of wife 
rape may show why some women choose to take the blame for the crime against 
them, and why some husbands maybe encouraged to believe that they have a right 
to sex and that wives have the obligation to comply. 
Terms to Be Studied 
Using discourse analysis, this study examined texts about wife rape from 
newspaper commentaries, which include letters to the editor, editorial staff-written 
commentaries, and syndicated opinion columns. The texts were based on news and 
current events, or on the author's decision of what to discuss about the issue of wife 
rape. 
The Lexis Nexis online archive was used as a primary source of newspaper 
commentaries. This database contains articles dating kom the late 1970s, which also 
is the era of the early discussions of wife rape (the Greta and John Rideout case first 
brought national attention to wife rape in late 1978). It is the most comprehensive 
archive for national newspaper texts available today, and as such, provided a 
significant portion of the commentaries about wife rape in the American 
newspapers. In addition, library indexes were searched to allow for a more 
comprehensive sampling frame of commentaries in the The Washington Post and The 
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New York Times and for the entire span of the commentaries from the Los Angeles 
Times. 
Newspaper commentaries have been chosen for two reasons: 
1) Little research has been done on this form of media discourse, including 
discourse on wife rape. 
2) Because open public discourse about wife rape is rare, commentaries can 
provide an insight into how the general public perceives this issue. As such, 
it is important to know what the audience is reading. Karpin (1997) argued 
that television both takes in and shapes any shifts in dominant ideology, 
thereby establishing the shifts as cultural norms. This analysis explored how 
and in what direction the norms concerning wife rape shifted in newspapers 
instead of television. 
The historical context is always important in an analysis of any cultural issue 
(Christians &Carey, 2000). Williams (1997) said that the media, through Americans' 
decreasing knowledge about history and increasing social segregation, have become 
the primary source of knowledge about other people. As stated in chapter two, the 
history of wife rape began long ago with the laws that made the rape of a woman by 
her husband legal. The change in legal status in the 1970s and 1980s did not end the 
history of the problem, and in fact, started a new debate. It is this 25-year-old debate 
that this study used as its beginning. From there, the history of modern wife rape 
norms and ideologies was examined. 
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Starting with the 1978 Rideout case, the first trial of a husband accused of 
raping his wife while still living with her, and proceeding to 2002, this study 
analyzed all commentaries in three of the nation s newspapers with the largest 
circulation (New York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times) (Audit Bureau 
of Circulations, 2003) focusing on the issue of wife rape. Two of the top five 
nationally circulated newspapers were not used: USA Today, because it did not 
begin printing unti11981, after the beginning of the time frame of this analysis; and 
The Wall Street Journal, because of its more business-dominant themes. The other 
three newspapers chosen have a more mass-audience appeal. 
Bergen (1996) said that references to wife rape have appeared sporadically in 
the media since the late 1970s, most frequently in relation to legislative changes. The 
occasional wife rape trial garnered national media coverage, including the Rideout 
case in 1978 and the Bobbitt tr ial in late 1993 and early 1994. Both cases brought 
attention to the issue of wife rape, but only for a brief period. Otherwise, the issue 
of wife rape has rather sporadically appeared in the national media. Therefore, it 
was expected that most of the newspaper references will focus around these two 
cases, as well as the occasional broader reference to wife rape legislation. The lack 
of coverage in the national media is in and of itself an interesting finding for 
discourse analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This discourse analysis sought to examine the newspaper commentaries 
about wife rape as they appeared in the commentaries in the three largest American 
newspapers. Its purpose was primarily to understand how the commentaries' 
discourse reflect and maintain society's sex-role ideologies concerning the issue of 
wife rape. All of the commentaries that appeared in the three newspapers from the 
period of the first wife rape trial 1978 in Oregon to the year 2003 were analyzed. 
This 25-year timeframe enabled the examination of the whole of public discourse, 
especially how the discourse may have changed over time. 
Thirty-two commentary pieces were found in the sample between 1978 and 
2002, containing a broad range of opinions. Seventeen were published in the 1970s, 
primarily surrounding the Rideout case at the end of 1978 and beginning of 1979. 
The Rideout trial was the first fi nal in the United States of a husband accused of 
raping his wife while the couple was living together. The couple temporarily 
reconciled after John Rideout was acquitted of rape, and this, too, was the subject of 
two commentaries (Buchwald,1979; Raspberry, 1979). Three commentaries, written 
by the Los Angeles Times editorial staff, were about California's decision to eliminate 
the wife rape exemption law in mid-1979 ("The case for," 1979; "People, not sexual," 
1979; "Let's punish rapists," 1979). Two commentaries were published in the 1980s, 
relating to legislative efforts to eliminate the marital exemption law in New York 
(Knaplund,1981; Reach, 1981), and one about a wife rape trial in the state ("Rape is 
rape," 1984). Eleven were published in the 1990s, primarily focusing on the Bobbitt 
trials in 1993 and 1994, in which John Wayne Bobbitt was tried for raping his wife, 
Lorena, as well as her subsequent trial for cutting off his penis with a butcher knife 
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("A wife, too," 1996; "Beyond snickering," 1993; Buchwald, 1994; Dershowitz, 1993; 
Mann, 1993; Peterson, 1995; Phillips, 1994; Ross, 1994; Boller, 1994; "The Lorena 
Bobbin," 1994; Twomey, 1993). Qne was published in 2002, focusing on legislative 
efforts to eliminate the marital exemption in Virginia (Barney, 2002) . 
Fourteen of the commentaries were published in The Washington Post (Barney, 
2002; "Beyond snickering," 1993; Buchwald, 1979; Cohen, 1978; Dorff, 1979; 
Goodman, 1979; Mann, 1978; Mann, 1993; McCarthy, 1979; Raspberry, 1979; "The 
Lorena Bobbin, 1994; "The Oregon rape," 1978; Twomey, 1993; Wi11,1978); seven in 
the New York Times (Knaplund,1981; "Marriage, rape and," 1978; Nodelman, 1979; 
Peterson, 1995; "Rape is rape," 1984; Reach, 1981; Stamper, 1979); and eleven in the 
Los Angeles Times ("A wife, too," 1996; Buchwald, 1994; Dershowitz, 1993; Kemp, 
. 1979; "Let's punish rapists," 1979; "People, not sexual," 1979; Phillips, 1994; Ross, 
1994; Soller,1994; "The answer lies," 1978; "The case f or," 1979) . The Washington 
Post was the primary newspaper to cover the Bobbin trials, perhaps because the trial 
took place in Manassas, Virginia, just west of the Washington, D.C. metro area. In 
total, 21 of the commentaries f ocused on the two main trials involving wif e rape (13 
on the Rideout trial and eight on the Bobbin trials). 
Table 1. Types and number of commentaries in each newspaper 
Newspaper
Los Angeles Times 
New York Times 
Washington Post 
Letters to 
the Editor 
4 
5 
1 
Syndicated 
Occasionals
2 
0 
12 
Staff-Written 
Editorials
5 
2 
1 
Tota!
11 
7 
14 
The most noticeable finding of this study, therefore, is the dearth of 
commentaries on this topic. Only 32 commentaries cover 25 years of publication, 
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very slightly more than one per year on average. Periods of peak coverage easily 
stand out, as 21 of the commentaries were about only two nationally publicized 
trials, which covered athree-month period in 1978-79 and approximately six months 
of 1993-94. Outside of these ru ne months, ru ne commentaries were left to cover the 
remainder of the 25 years, including all of the 1980s, and most of the 1990s. No 
matter what the opinions expressed in the commentaries, this small number does 
not lend itself to capturing the attention and understanding of the reading public. 
Much like the findings of previous researchers (fluster &Leone, 2001; 
Finkelhor & Yllo,1985; Kirkwood &Cecil, 2001; Langhinrichsen-Rohling &Monson, 
1998; Monson et x1.,1996, 2000; Simonson & Subich,1999), the authors of the 
commentaries believed that wife rape was, at the very least, undesirable. Some 
commentaries were a mixture of support, but only five openly suggested that wife 
rape should not be punished legally as severely as other rape crimes (Wil1,1978; 
Mann, 1978; Goodman, 1979; Nodelman,1979; Raspberry, 1979). Another was more 
ambiguous about whether wife rape should be punished less severely (Buchwald, 
1979). This author suggested that the post-trial reconciliation of John and Greta 
Rideout made it difficult for him and others like him to maintain the pro-legislation 
stance they held before and during the tr ial. All of these were found in the earliest 
era of the coverage, in 1978 and 1979. No commentary considered wife rape an
impossibility, and all expressed their opposition to rape in general. The 
commentaries demonstrated a wide range of support for wife rape legislation (i.e., 
eliminating the "marital exemption" clause from state codes). Some indicated. 
strong support, others showed lukewarm concern for the issue, while some saw it as 
merely a hypothetical issue, not something that applies to many real-life situations. 
In all, only six of the commentaries expressed a desire to maintain the wife rape 
exemption laws (Buchwald,1979; Goodman, 1979; Mann, 1978; Nodelman, 1979; 
Raspberry, 1979; Wi11,1978). That is not to say the authors were in favor of 
husbands raping wives, but they predominantly argued that the laws for assault 
would better apply to cases of wife rape than actual rape laws, because husbands 
were more likely to be convicted of the lesser crime of assault than the more serious 
crime of rape. 
The Themes 
Discourse analysis of the 32 commentaries revealed four themes related to the 
issue of public discourse about wife rape and sex-role ideology: (1) gender 
attribution, or how the commentaries associate victims and perpetrators as female or 
male and how they nominate the term "wife rape" and how it is defined; (2) gender 
balance, or how the hierarchical structure and balance of the marital relationship is 
defined and described; (3) the use of gender-based myths and fantasies as an
understanding of wife rape; and (4) how feminism and feminists were credited or 
blamed for the introduction of wife rape laws. Some of these themes are 
interrelated, and they will be discussed as such. 
Theme One: Gender Attribution 
Nomination and Attribution 
Nomination is the way in which something is termed or named. Attribution 
is how the cause is explained and defined for a behavior, e.g., how wife raped is 
defined in terms of who rapes whom. In general, in the commentaries there is a lack 
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of gender identification in the nomination of rape in marriage by using the term wife 
rape. In only one commentary did the term "wife rape" appear (Barney, 2002), and 
that was within a quotation from a news article on which the commentary was 
based. The remainder of the commentaries used a variety of non-gender-specific 
terms to nominate the act of wif e rape, including marital rape (Cohen, 1978; "The 
case for," 1979; Dorff, 1979; Knaplund, 1981; "Rape is rape," 1974; Mann, 1993), 
spousal rape (Mann, 1978; "The case f or," 1979; "People, not sexual," 1979; "Let's 
punish rapists," 1979), rape in marriage (Wil1,1978; "Marriage, rape," 1978; 
Raspberry, 1979), and infra-marital rape (Raspberry, 1979, Stamper, 1979). The other 
terms used did not refer to rape at all, choosing instead such phrases such as "forced 
sex in marriage" (Cohen, 1978), "compulsory sexual intercourse in marriage" 
(McCarthy, 1979), "sexual assault by a spouse" (Kemp, 1979), and "rape between 
spouses" ("The Oregon rape," 1978). One phrase approached gender specificity 
without achieving an actual attribution of the direction of the attack: "husband-wife 
rape" (Buchwald,1979) . 
It is possible that use of the term "wife rape" is potentially problematic from a 
copy editor's standpoint, in that it involves a noun (wife) modifying another noun 
(rape), anon-standard grammatical style. Use of "marital rape" uses an adjective to 
modify a noun, which is possibly more accepted amongst copy editors, and 
therefore might influence a newspaper's decision on how to nominate wif e rape. 
However, the use of the terms "wife abuse" and "wif e battering" in several of the 
commentaries (Goodman, 1979; McCarthy, 1979; Knaplund, 1981; Mann, 1993) 
suggests that the use of other terms involving the noun-modifying-noun style is not 
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entirely ruled out. Therefore, the use of "wif e rape" instead of non-gender-specific 
terms is equally plausible. 
When the commentaries dealt with the legal concept of exempting a husband 
from being charged with raping his wife, there is continued, though less, gender 
ambiguity in nomination. Three commentaries ref erred to the law as spousal 
immunity or spousal exclusion ("The answer lies," 1978; Goodman, 1979; Dorff, 
1979) or marital immunity or marital privilege ("The answer lies," 1978; Knaplund, 
1981). 
Beyond the terms used for the act of wif e rape, however, there is a degree of 
gender attribution in the definitions of wife rape, or in how the act is described 
rather than named. A New York Times commentary was titled "When a Husband 
Rapes His Wife" and ref erred to the "rape of wives" in the text (Nodelman,1979). 
Another discusses a "husband's immunity" from rape (Knaplund, 1981), and later 
uses "sexual assault of wives" as its definition. These definitions tend to show the 
direction of who is assaulting whom (i.e., that husbands are raping wives) more than 
the neutral nominations. 
More confusingly, some commentaries used a combination of gender 
ambiguity and specificity both in terminology and definitions. One commentary 
nominated wife rape as "intramarital sexual intercourse against the will of the wife" 
(Nodelman,1979). A Los Angeles Times commentary, written by the editorial staff of 
the newspaper, discussed Oregon's eliminating "spousal immunity" in rape laws, 
then summed it up as follows: "In plain English, that meant that a wif e could charge 
her husband with rape" ("The answer lies," 1978). 
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The gender-ambiguous terminologies used, combined with occasionally more 
gender-specific definitions, suggest that the authors acknowledged that rape in 
marriage is generally committed by husbands on wives, but that they are not willing 
to label the crime in a gender specific way. Although husbands also can be raped by 
their wives, gender specificity in defining wife rape is important because such a 
large majority of victims are wives. Most victims of other f orms of assault in a 
marriage are women, and several of the commentaries ref erred to this as "wif e 
abuse," "wif e battering," or "wif e beating" while simultaneously ref erring to 
"spousal exclusions," "forced sex," and "marital rape" (Goodman, 1979; McCarthy, 
1979; Knaplund, 1-981; Mann, 1993). A New York Times commentary referred to both 
battery and rape in the same sentence, assigning gender to battery, but not to rape. 
"Considering the striking similarities between marital rape and wife abuse, it is 
surprising that the two problems are so rarely linked together" (Knaplund,1981). 
A recent commentary (Barney, 2002) labeled the crime "wife rape," a sign that 
gender attribution in the nomination of the crime is approaching that of equating 
"domestic abuse" as "wife abuse." The use of "wife rape" in the news article 
headline to which this commentary refers is a possible indication that the term "wife 
rape" was becoming more common and accepted in usage toward the latter part of 
the commentary coverage being studied. With only one example of the nomination 
of "wif e rape," however, it is impossible to tell whether this was an anomaly or truly 
the beginning of a trend. 
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General Content and Attribution 
Beyond the nomination and definition of wife rape, the commentaries more 
often provide gender attribution to male rapists and female victims, though with 
continued ambiguity of gender identification in many places. None of the 
commentaries are completely free of gender attribution, although the degree of 
attribution varies both across commentaries and within each commentary. 
Eight commentaries specifically confirmed that the laws are to protect women 
while simultaneously using gender-neutral terms, such as "spouse," "partner," or 
"lover" within the same paragraph to describe the assailant (Cohen, 1978; Wi11,1978; 
Mann; 1978; "The Oregon rape," 1978; Kemp, 1979; "People, not sexual," 1979; 
Knaplund, 1981; Twomey, 1993). A commentary against wife rape legislation in the 
Washington Post (Wi11,1978) posited that "a partner in a marriage must have 
recourse to the law when the other partner resorts to violence. But it is a grave 
business when one partner can charge the other with a felony." The author then 
added that most of the legal advances women have scored had been for the better, 
indicating a realization that legislation was being enacted to benefit women raped 
by husbands, and not just one "partner" against another. Yet he was gender neutral 
in multiple places throughout his commentary when describing the act of rape. 
The issue of gender neutrality or ambiguity is not easily categorized 
according to the intent of the commentary's stance on wife rape. Many of the 
commentaries in favor of anti-wife-rape legislation used ambiguity as well. For 
example, a Washington Post commentary that was pro-legislation ("The Oregon _ 
rape," 1978) argued that "the difficulty in proving rape between spouses" (an 
ambiguous attribution of gender) did not mean that the law should not 
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acknowledge this form of rape. Two sentences later, the author opined that the 
Oregon legal initiative to eliminate the marital rape exemption from its laws "is 
aimed at protecting women against violence." In the preceding paragraph, the 
author stated that "it is most unlikely that there will be a wave of cases in which one 
spouse charges the other with rape..." 
Meanwhile, a commentary written to the New York Times (Nodelman,1979), 
staunchly against wife-rape legislation consistently referred to wives charging 
husbands and husbands compelling wives to have sex. The author used the gender-
neutral word "victim" once in a sentence that broadly defined rape. In another 
statement, the author referred to traditional notions of rape as a "stranger accosting 
a woman." "Stranger" is gender neutral, but the use of "woman" as the person 
being accosted removes at least a degree of the gender neutrality from the reference 
to the commentary's other gender neutral terms. 
Another instance of partial gender neutrality is in a Washington Post 
commentary that was patently against wife rape legislation (Mann,1978). The 
author sometimes used specific genders in reference to husband rapists and wife 
victims, but she also employed partial ambiguity, such as the phrase "...women 
cannot be beaten up by their spouses and their spouses cannot get off scot free." 
What is rarer still is the use of gender-specific terms to describe the 
man/husband with neutral words to describe the woman/wife. In none of the 
commentaries were husbands described as raping or assaulting their "spouses." If 
there was mixed gender specificity in a commentary, it was always the men or 
husbands who were described in the neutral form. With the use of gender-neutral 
words to describe men and husbands, such as "spouse," as earlier discussed, there 
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seemed to be an effort at minimizing the attribution of blame. Perhaps there is no 
need to describe the female in gender-neutral terms because there is no blame to be 
placed on her, as they are the victims instead of the attacker. 
Another way that attribution is designated, and sex-role ideologies are 
maintained, in the commentaries is when women are described as the reason for 
changing the marital exemption laws. In multiple commentaries, the laws were 
described as attempting to "protect" women or wives from assault ("Marriage, rape, 
1978; "The Oregon rape," 1978; Goodman, 1979; Dorff,1979; Knaplund,1981; Reach, 
1981), but none described the law as being designed to hold husbands accountable 
for their actions in raping their wives. This supports the anti-feminist argument that 
women are responsible for avoiding being raped (e.g., Hoff Sommers, 1994). The 
idea, therefore, that laws are protecting women instead of holding men accountable 
may be seen as "victim feminism" or merely another form of feminism in the laws. 
In addition, it perpetuates the perception that wife rape is less serious, or less 
criminal, than other forms of rape by placing the responsibility and reason for the 
law on those who are least to blame. 
Theme Two: Gender Balance 
In cases where wives and husbands are not identified by their given names, 
there is a dif f erence in how each are portrayed. The most common labels used in 
association with one another are "wife" and "husband," which suggests an equal 
role in the relationship (as opposed to "man" and wife" and vice versa, which will 
be discussed later). The term "husband," however, is more often listed before 
"wife" in the commentaries. This sequence is significant in that it privileges the 
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traditional description of married couples as "husband and wife," with the husband 
as the leader of the household.. These commentaries, therefore, maintain that 
ranking. A 2002 commentary in the Washington Post (Barney, 2002) was the only one 
that differed by saying, "Wives and husbands have charged spouses with child 
molestation." In other similar situations, husbands were always listed first ("The 
answer lies,"1978; "Marriage, rape," 1978; Goodman, 1979). 
There were two references to married couples as "man and wife," which 
shows a clear imbalance in the relationship (Raspberry, 1979; Dorff,1979). "Man" is 
an _individual, while "wife" can only be defined in relation to being married to a 
man. This phrase was used only twice in the commentaries as such. "Husband and 
wife" and "man and wife" were most notable in the commentaries in the late 1970s. 
This could suggest that, even if sex-role stereotypes and biased gender attitudes still 
do exist, commentary writers are becoming more aware of the words' potential 
negative implications, and are opting for more egalitarian terms. 
More frequently observed was the Level of action given to each gender when 
the two words were not linked together as a single phrase (i.e., "man and wife"). It 
was more common to see the "woman" associated directly with "husband" than it 
was to see "man" associated directly with "wife." There were 39 direct relative 
statements associating "woman" with "husband," while there were only 16 
instances of "man" and "wife." Although this may show that women were given 
more power in the relationship than men, there were many more action verbs and 
phrases given to "man" than to "woman." In other words, women were more often 
depicted as having something happen or done to them than were men ("women" 
linked with "husband" had twice as many passive statements as active ones, while 
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"men" linked with "wife" had fewer passive statements than active ones). These 
instances were sometimes f ound in positive statements about the woman and her 
rights, but her more frequent passivity implies again that the laws were being 
changed for her instead of holding men accountable f or rape. 
Some examples of women /wives in passive statements include, "...maybe 
some women will be encouraged to bring rape charges against their husbands" 
(Mann, 1978); "...when a woman is raped by her husband" (Stamper, 1979); 
"women who are raped by their husbands" (Knaplund,1981); and "a wife cannot be 
forced to have sex with her husband" ("A wife, too," 1996). 
Interestingly, in instances where "wife" and "husband" were linked instead 
of "woman" and "husband," there tended to be more active statements f or the wife: 
"...a wife could charge her husband" ("The answer Iies," 1978); "the right of a wife 
to prosecute her husband" (Dorff,1979); "If a wife says 'no' to sex with her 
husband..." (Barney, 2002). The reason why "wives" were given more active 
statements than "women" in the context of being linked with "husband" is unclear. 
Perhaps it is more acceptable f or "wives" to show active resistance than f or 
"women" more generally, but there was no identifiable trend to show why this 
occurred. The only thing in common for these commentaries is that they were 
written by authors who supported the elimination of the marital rape exemption. 
Men overall were given more active statements, but in the context of 
"husband" being linked to "wife," men were given the most active statements. Men 
described in passive roles were most frequently found within a legal context, e.g., "a 
man has been tried f or the alleged rape of his wife" ("Marriage, rape," 1978); "a man 
was acquitted of raping his wife" ("The Oregon rape," 1978); and "a jury can give a 
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man six months ..." (Mann, 1978) . There was no reference to a "man" being passive 
to his wife. A husband was sometimes a direct object of a wife's action, e.g., 
"woman's right to accuse her husband" ("Marriage, rape," 1978). Often times, they 
are objects of a preposition, e.g., "rape laws are to protect women from their 
husbands" (Dorff,1979); "women living apart from their husbands" (Knaplund, 
1981); "a wife cannot be f orced to have sex with her husband" ("A wife, too," 1996) . 
However, men were never portrayed as passive to the action of the woman or wife. 
The issue of women and men as passive or active characters in sentences 
reflect the sex-role stereotyping discussed in chapter two. Not only are women to be 
protected by rape laws, as discussed above, but often they are acted upon by their 
husbands, whereas men are acted upon only by outside forces, such as the courts. 
Even commentaries that argue in favor of wife-rape legislation (which eliminates a 
husband's ri ht to ra e his wife) may still reflect the ender roles that allowed the g p g 
marital exemption laws to exist in the first place. 
Theme Three: Myths and Fantasies 
A large part of sex-role ideology is based on the acceptance of cultural norms 
of gender and gender roles. In the case of rape, and wife rape in particular, there are 
multiple myths and misconceptions that lead to rape-supportive beliefs in the 
public. The surveys highlighted in chapter two demonstrated that while people 
generally acknowledged that wife rape was undesirable, it was certainly not taken 
as seriously as other forms of rape. But studies like Russell's (1990) showed that 
women who have experienced wife rape are highly traumatized, at least as much as 
that associated with other forms of rape. 
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The commentaries on wife rape are quite diverse in their use of myths and 
misconceptions to understand wife rape. Although some commentaries utilize the 
myths to make their argument, others use the myths to prove them wrong. Even 
those that denounce the myths show that they still exist; why else would they need 
to be argued against? 
The following six myths appear in one form or another in the commentaries: 
1) Women sometimes like being forced into having sex. 
2) Women will invent wife rape charges to get even or to get better divorce 
settlements. 
3) Wife rape is less traumatic than other forms of rape. 
4) Wife rape is not the usual, typical, or normal kind of rape. 
5) Wife rape is too difficult to prove unless the wife is obviously battered. 
6) The law/ government has no place in the marital bedroom. 
Each of these myths will be examined in their context in the commentaries on 
wife rape. 
Myth One: Women Sometimes Like Being Forced to Have Sex 
The stereotype that women say "no" when they really mean "yes" was 
occasionally used in the commentaries, though, to their credit, the myth is 
mentioned predominantly in order to criticize it, or at least to downplay it.~ 
The first commentary on wif e rape f ound in the newspapers (Cohen, 1978), 
began by talking about the author's experience watching Rhea Butler carry a 
"willful but beautiful" Scarlett O'Hara up the stairs to force himself on her in the 
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film Gone With the Wind. Scarlett woke up the following morning in her bed, with a 
smile. "She was happy at last. Her husband had raped her," the author said. He 
then told how he and his teenage friends thought this was typical behavior of 
women—they fought sex, but really they wanted men to force them. And husbands, 
the author believed, were able to do just what they wanted to do with their wives. 
On reaching adulthood, the author said he learned the truth—that women may not 
like being forced, as he thought, but that he was right about husbands being able to 
do what they wanted to wives. Wife rape, therefore, was legal. The author then 
went on to discuss how this view of Scarlett O'Hara as a typical woman permeates 
views on wife rape, and how the law needed to change to disallow husbands the 
right to rape their wives. 
Two other commentaries mentioned the Gone With the Wind scene as an
example of how people may view wife rape (Buchwald,1979; "Rape is rape," 1984). 
One of them, a 1979 commentary in The Washington Post (Buchwald, 1979), argued 
that Greta Rideout may have proved the movie scene as at least occasionally 
accurate. The author described himself as being strongly against rape, and 
supported "women's liberators" and Greta Rideout in her trial against her husband 
until, he said, she reconciled with her husband. The author said his wife mentioned 
to him the rape scene in Gone With the Wind, and how that scene was perhaps not too 
different from the story of the Rideouts. Before and during the trial, the author said 
he was incredulous at the comparison, but when the Rideouts reconciled, he said he 
thought his wife might be right after all. John. Rideout may not be Clark Gable (the 
actor who portrayed Rhett Butler), but "'Greta Rideout could be another Vivian 
Leigh [the actress who played Scarlett O'HaraJ." The idea led the author to state 
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that he would never "take sides in another husband-wife rape case again without 
thinking of Gone With the Wind." 
A third Washington Post commentary (Raspberry, 1979) mentions this myth, 
and downplays its validity without actually criticizing it. The author elaborated, 
"But nearly every man knows (or thinks he knows) of women who say no, no, no 
when what they mean is: Force me. A few men still believe that every woman wants 
to be raped..." He then went on to talk about "enlightened, progressive men" such 
as himself who considered the broader implications of wife rape. In this case, three 
phrases in the commentary attempted to minimize the view that women want to be 
raped. First, the parenthetical "or thinks he knows" in the first sentence of the 
quotation, suggests that maybe these men are not right but only perceive they are 
right about women. Second, the adjective "few" used in front of men who believe 
women want to be raped suggested that most men do not feel that way. Third, by 
labeling some men as "enlightened, progressive" the author suggested that men 
who believe women want to be raped are unenlightened. However, the author 
never actually wrote that this perspective is wrong, and the rest of his commentary 
suggested that wife rape is less serious, thereby committing to another myth. 
Another Washington Post commentary printed later in 1979 (Dorff, 1979) that 
supported wife-rape legislation acknowledged that "the idea that a woman might 
say 'no' to her husband is unthinkable in the eyes of the law. But then, the law often 
finds it difficult to imagine a woman saying'no."' 
None of the commentaries from the 1990s, primarily concerned with the 
Bobbitt firials, mentioned this myth. A 2002 commentary from the Washington Post 
(Barney, 2002) quoted a Virginia House delegate who asked, "If a wife simply said 
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no and the husband wanted to have relations, is that rape?" This view is similar to 
the view that women do not really mean no when they say "no," but it also suggests 
that a wife does not have a right to say no to her husband. The rare mention of this 
myth in the later commentaries could suggest that 1) the myth is no longer thought 
appropriate or 2) that it simply was not the focus of any of these commentaries. The 
quotation above suggests that perhaps the latter is more accurate, though perhaps 
also in combination with a reduced readiness to believe the myth. 
Myth Two: Wives will invent rape charges for revenge or better divorce settlements 
An argument against wife-rape legislation is that wives will invent charges of 
rape against their husbands in divorce proceedings to get a better settlement, or 
merely to exact revenge against them. This myth was mentioned as a common 
argument in several commentaries throughout the study's time period (Cohen, 1978; 
Wi11,1978; Knaplund,1981; "Rape is rape," 1984; Dershowitz,1993). In two of the 
commentaries, the authors outrightly supported this myth (Wi11,1978; Dershowitz, 
1993). In the three others, the authors denounced it. However, the mere presence of 
the myth in the commentaries suggests that it persists in the public. Writers needed 
to discuss this further if the intent was to minimize its negative impact. 
One commentary (Dershowitz,1993) that used a form of this myth is in 
reference to Lorena Bobbitt's rape accusation against her husband, John. The author 
questioned the validity of Lorena's rape allegation, and warned that "the 
widespread support she is receiving will only serve to encourage others...to concoct 
stories of victimization as a cover for their own unprovoked violence." The use of 
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gender neutral words here maybe somewhat misleading in that the rest of the 
commentary focuses on Lorena and other women who live with abusive husbands. 
In a commentary in the Washington Post (Wi11,1978), the author used this 
myth in one brief sentence. The commentary in general preferred the charge of 
"assault" instead of "rape" for instances of wife rape. "The problems of proof 
relating to the charge of rape in marriage are obvious as is the potential for abuse of 
the charge in divorce proceedings." The use of the word "obvious" in reference to 
this claim suggested that there is clear evidence that women have or will use rape 
charges for personal gain. However, there is no empirical evidence to substantiate 
this claim. 
Another commentary (Knaplund,1981) disputes this myth on the very 
grounds that women have not used the crime in divorce cases at all. The other two 
commentaries (Cohen, 1978, "Rape is rape," 1984) downplayed the importance of 
the myth and argued that the possibility of a wife using this crime in divorce 
proceedings should not deter the law from prohibiting husbands from raping their 
wives. 
Myth Three: Wife Rape is Less Traumatic 
Earlier in this chapter, the terminology and definitions of wife rape used in 
the commentaries were explained as being primarily non-gender specific. They also 
tended to diminish the concept of wife rape by defining it as more a matter of sex 
gone awry than actual rape. A Washington Post commentary called wife rape 
"compulsory sexual intercourse in marriage" (McCarthy, 1979). Compulsory is 
defined as either 1) obligatory; required; or 2) coercive (Soukhanev,1993). The two 
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definitions can cast quite divergent lights on the intent of the commentary. Is 
"compulsory sexual intercourse in marriage" obligatory sex or coercive sex? The 
latter suggests something closer to the standard definition of rape, but the first 
suggests that the sex is a requirement in marriage. Either way, the phrase 
emphasizes the act as mere sexual intercourse, directly opposing the findings of 
Bergen (1996), Finkelhor & Yllo (1985), and Russell (1990) who empirically have 
shown that wife rape is much more often a matter of control and violence than it is 
about acfival sexual intercourse. If a woman is raped by a stranger, it is unlikely that 
reports would say she had "compulsory sexual intercourse with a stranger." Why, 
then, should wife rape be labeled this way? 
Wife rape is similarly defined in the commentaries as "intramarital sexual 
intercourse against the will of the wife" (Nodelman, 1979). Another author suggests 
that a husband sometimes "compels a wife to have sexual intercourse against her 
will" (Raspberry, 1979). Again, the use of the phrase "sexual intercourse" in the 
definition detracts from the fact that the intercourse is rape, "the crime of forcing 
another person to submit to sex acts, especially sexual intercourse" (Soukhanev, 
1993). The concept of wife rape involving sexual intercourse is understood, but 
again, most other kinds of rapes are called rape, or perhaps forced sex, not "sexual 
intercourse against the will of the victim" (emphasis added). 
This myth also was emphasized in the earlier commentaries in which several 
authors argued that wives would be better off charging their husbands with assault 
than with rape because it would be easier to convict (Wi11,1978; Mann, 1978; 
Goodman, 1979; Nodelman,1979; Raspberry, 1979). The authors agreed that wife 
rape is unfortunate, but their reasons for preferring assault charges to rape charges 
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were different. Two of them directly argued that wife rape is less serious than other 
forms of rape; that after a wife is raped, there may be "resentment or injured 
feelings, but the overall effect cannot be compared to rape by a stranger" 
(Nodelman,1979; Raspberry, 1979). The others (Wi11,1978; Mann, 1978; Goodman, 
1979) argued that jurors would be more likely to convict a husband of a crime such 
as assault, which is punished less severely than rape crimes. They argued that 
because sex is part of a normal marriage, jurors would have too difficult a time 
disassociating normal sex with the violent act of rape and would thereby hesitate 
sending a husband to prison for something so closely related to a "normal" 
marriage. 
Myth Four: Wife rape is not the usual, typical, or normal kind of rape 
When many people think of rape, they think of a stranger accosting a woman 
in a dark alley. Studies on public perception (fluster &Leone, 2001; Finkelhor & 
Yllo, 1985; Kirkwood &Cecil, 2001; Langhinrichsen-Rohling &Monson, 1998; 
Monson et al., 1996, 2000; Simonson & Subich,1999) show that people consider this 
the most serious, traumatic, and frequent type of rape. In reality, however, most 
rapists are someone the victim knows, and the rapes most often take place in a 
familiar location. Ina 1997 U.S. Deparhnent of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 
study, Greenfield found that just more than half of all rapes take place at the victim's 
home or the home of a friend or acquaintance. Of the more than 485,000 rapes 
committed in 1993, approximately 75% were committed by someone (or multiple 
people) known to the victim (Greenfield, 1997). Russell's (1990) study also showed 
that wife rape is not rare, and, as stated in chapter two, it is highly traumatic for the 
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wives raped by their husbands. This disparity between public perception and 
victim's reality is evident in the commentaries as well. 
Two commentaries used words that minimize the seriousness and frequency 
of wife rape (McCarthy, 1979; Nodelman, 1979), though one appears to do so 
unintentionally because the remainder of the commentary was in favor of wife-rape 
legislation (McCarthy, 1979). In this commentary, the author noted that "the consent 
issue is perplexing enough in ordinary rape trials" (emphasis added). In the other 
commentary (Nodelman, 1979), the author qualified that "in the usual rape case, 
where a stranger accosts a woman..." (emphasis added). Both of these examples use 
a form of marked vs. unmarked words discussed in chapter two. "Normal" rape 
means a stranger attacks someone. Rape of any other kind must be modified 
because it is unusual (e.g., wife rape, date rape, and acquaintance rape). Although 
both of these commentaries used an adjective to modify rape, they are adjectives 
that further show the typical unmarked status of rape when committed by a stranger 
on a stranger. 
A different form of minimizing is found in a Washington Post commentary 
(Goodman, 1979) in which the author argued that rape "especially in marriage, is 
often too loaded an accusation to be useful." The author concluded that changing 
the accusation from rape to assault would clarify issues, "removing from our minds 
the layers of sexual fantasies and historical 'rights."' This assertion represents myths 
one, four, five and six (the latter two to be discussed later). The idea that wife rape 
should be classified as assault in order to remove "layers of sexual fantasies" is 
problematic because it associates those fantasies only with wife rape. Perhaps there 
are no "fantasies" involved in "normal" rape cases, but the violent, assault-based 
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pornography available suggests that those who rape anyone—stranger or 
wife—may have fantasies about the act. To argue that wife rape only should be 
reduced to an assault charge for reasons of "sexual fantasies" minimizes the 
similarity of wife rape and other forms of rape. 
More generally, the presence of these commentaries in the newspaper, 
especially the earliest ones from the late 1970s, demonstrates the perceived 
abnormality of wife rape. In the 1970s, rape awareness was a prevalent issue in 
women's rights movements, in the media, and among the general public (Russell, 
1990). But little was discussed in this awareness movement about wife rape in 
particular. The fact that these commentaries existed merely in the presence of a 
nationally publicized wife-rape trial instead of as a more general discussion of the 
trauma of rape shows the tendency to view it as an "other" or "unusual" kind of 
rape. 
Myth Five: Wife rape is too difficult to prove unless the wife is obviously battered 
Perhaps the most prevalent, and least arguable, myth is that wife rape is the 
hardest kind of rape to prove in court. There are difficulties in proving wife rape 
that proving stranger rape does not have. For example, the issue of previous 
consensual sex would make it nearly impossible to use semen as evidence of assault 
as is often used in a stranger rape case. However, some commentaries suggested 
that the difficulty in proving wife rape was insurmountable, making it unreasonable 
to illegalize. 
This was a primary myth for authors who felt husbands should be charged 
with assault when they rape their wives. Similar to what he calls the "obvious" 
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issue of wives abusing the law in divorce proceedings, the author of a commentary 
in the The Washington Post (Will, 1978) wrote that "the problems of proof relating to 
the charge of rape in marriage are obvious." He then advocated the use of assault 
laws in wife rape. Another commentary (Mann, 1978) argued that, unless a wife 
appears in court "so beaten up as to be able to prove conclusively that she was 
raped," her husband would not be convicted. Then, minimizing the trauma of the 
rape, the author asked, "...which has hurt her more: Being raped by her husband or 
having her jaw broken?" The author apparently thought the broken jaw would be 
worse, and thus suggested that the husband be brought to court on assault instead 
of rape, the more "serious" and more obvious offense. 
Discussing the john Bobbitt rape trial, the author of a commentary in The 
Washington Post ("Beyond snickering," 1993) discussed Lorena Bobbin's testimony 
as not strong, in part because "there was no physical evidence of force." This is 
similar to commentaries that suggest that for a wife to be believed, there should be 
physical evidence of the abuse. Such contentions go against the findings of 
Finkelhor & Yllo (1985) and Russell (1990) who found that non-sexual physical force 
often was not part of the rape, at least not to the extent of leaving heavy bruises or 
contusions. 
Another author indicated that he and others like him were "very 
uncomfortable over what constitutes appropriate evidence that such a rape has 
occurred" (emphasis by author) (Raspberry, 1979). 
More positively, many commentary writers acknowledged the difficulties in 
proving wife rape cases without arguing that the crime should therefore not exist 
(Cohen, 1978; "The answer lies," 1978; "Marriage, rape,"1978; "The Oregon rape," 
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1978; McCarthy,1979; "The case for," 1979; "Let's punish rapists," 1979; Dorff, 1979). 
A Los Angeles Times commentary ("Let's punish rapists," 1979) was disappointed 
that the penalties f or wif e rape in Calif ornia were "not as tough" as f or other f orms 
of rape, but acknowledged that setting the precedent that wif e rape was illegal was a 
good first step. Another ("The answer lies," 1978) said that part of the reason why 
wife rape is more difficult to prove is because "what is violence in one part of our 
culture is accepted behavior in another." As with the presence of other myths in the 
commentaries, this positive assertion suggests that the myth still exists, but that not 
all the authors are unwilling to accept it. 
Myth Six: The law/government has no place in the marital bedroom 
The last myth f ound in the commentariess is more a misconception than a 
myth. Only two authors questioned whether wife rape should be a legal matter 
because the government had no right to invade the marital bedroom (Wi11,1978; 
Raspberry, 1979). Most of the remaining references to this myth were in the form of 
defending the laws against those who feel the law should not interfere in the marital 
bedroom or "the sanctity of marriage" (Cohen, 1978; "Marriage, rape," 1798; "The 
Oregon rape," 1978; Kemp, 1979; Dorff, 1979; Knaplund,1981; "Rape is rape," 1984) . 
One author (Dorff, 1979) argued that the government should get involved in the 
marital bedroom "only when a party does not consent to the sexual encounter." 
Some commentaries compared the idea of law or government in the bedroom 
as similar to the laws preventing other f orms of wife abuse (Knaplund,1981; "Rape 
is rape," 1984). One (Knaplund,1981) claimed that the "government exists to 
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interfere and regulate certain conduct to protect its citizens, as it already does when 
a husband assaults, kidnaps, robs, defrauds, or murders his wife." 
One commentary tried to balance the issue of privacy and allowing the law 
into the bedroom (Mann, 1978). The author said that the jury in the Rideout trial 
"duck[ed] the larger constitutional questions of whether Oregon's new [wife rape] 
law...violates the privacy of the home." Privacy in this case apparently means 
privacy from the eyes of the law or government. 
This myth was perhaps the least mentioned and the one that lacks the detail 
of the six myths examined in this study. However, it was important because the 
authors who did argue against it used it as one of their primary arguments. 
Summary of the Myths in the Commentaries 
It is important to stress that the most rape-supportive statements were made 
in the commentaries discussing the Rideout case in 1978 and 1979. The 
commentaries in the 1980s through 2002, while including some statements that 
could be considered gender-biased, were more often written from a perspective 
defending the illegalization of wife rape. However, although it is encouraging that 
the authors in later commentaries seemed to have a more supportive attitude 
toward wife-rape legislation, the continuous need to defend the issue in the 
commentaries is a sign that not everyone in the public is so supportive. If everyone, 
or even nearly everyone, agreed that wife rape should be a crime, there would be no 
need to discuss it on the commentary pages. The fact that the sole 21St century 
commentary (Barney, 2002) was written to defend wife-rape legislation and demand 
that it be upheld in Virginia is disheartening. This commentary shows that there are 
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still those who hold onto these rape-supportive myths and would allow a husband 
to rape his wife without incrimination. 
It is also important to note that the John Bobbitt wife rape trial did not bring 
out as many of the myths as did the Rideout case. It could be surmised that the 
myths were not as commonly held in the 1990s, but the prevalence of the myths 
discussed in the 2002 commentary (Barney, 2002) would contradict that. Amore 
likely reason, judging by the content of these commentaries, is that the trial was too 
overwhelmed by the discussion of what Lorena Bobbitt did to John Bobbitt (i.e., 
severing his penis while he slept) to effectively discuss the implications of wife rape. 
One author all but admitted this when he asserted, "Indeed, if Lorena hadn't sliced 
off John's manhood, the Bobbitts would have remained a pathetic, obscure couple 
embroiled in anon-headline marital rape case..." (Twomey, 1993). 
Theme Four: Feminism and Wife Rape 
One additional point of interest in the commentaries is how feminism is tied 
to the issue of wif e rape. References were made in commentaries throughout the era 
to feminism and gender relations. 
An early commentary (Buchwald,1979) used the term "women's lib" in 
arguing that charging husbands with raping their wives is an attempt to "satisfy the 
outcry of women's lib." A response from a reader (Stamper, 1979) denounces the 
idea that wife-rape legislation is about the women's lib movement as "a disgrace." 
Other early commentaries are less direct about naming the women's rights 
movement of the era. There are several references to the general improvement in 
women's independence and individual status in society, and the authors suggested 
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that it is a beneficial and positive thing, at least "by and large," as one author wrote 
(Will, 1978). Another author proclaimed the marital exemption laws an
"embarrassing carry over from an unashamed sexist age" (Kemp, 1979). Another 
author argued that the issue of wife rape is not a "women's rights" issue, but one of 
the government's role in the bedroom (Raspberry, 1979). Another author said that 
since women have been allowed to become police officers, more women have felt 
comfortable reporting rapes, which he considered a positive step (McCarthy, 1979). 
A 1981 commentary (Knaplund, 1981) praised the efforts of the preceding ten years 
to increase the amount of attention paid to rape, which coincides with the beginning 
of the 1970s women's rights movement. 
There is a change, however, in the 1990s commentaries, which focused on the 
Bobbitt trials. Reference to gender relations and women's rights became more 
combative and often less positive. One author wondered about the effect of the 
Bobbitt trials on "male-female relations" (Mann, 1993). Her answer came in the 
form of an indirect quote that the trials could "whip up more of a backlash against 
women's progress." The author summarized the Bobbitts as "an example of how 
explosive relations between men and women can be." Another author concluded 
that, in this case, "there are no universal lessons here about the war between the 
sexes..." (emphasis added) ("The Lorena Bobbitt," 1994). These phrases all use 
words that suggest a fight or combat, picking one gender against the other. This is 
hardly the point of wife rape legislation. Furthermore, phrases like these did not 
appear in the commentaries from the 1970s or 1980s. 
More subtly, one author used the gender neutral "people" to describe those 
who supported Lorena Bobbitt, but then goes on to quote a woman, who quipped, 
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"Every woman I've talked to about this says,'Way to go!"' (emphasis added) 
(Dershowitz,1993). This implies that Lorena's supporters are women, which maybe 
fairly obvious given what she did to her husband. Nonetheless, the author's 
primary point is that Lorena Bobbitt, and those who support her, represent the 
ascendance of vigilante violence and the use of story fabrication and victimization as 
an excuse for their actions. The author argued that women who are childless have 
no excuse to take the law into their own hands, which again implies that, despite his 
attempt at gender neutrality, or he specifically meant women like Lorena Bobbitt. 
The commentaries surrounding the Bobbitt trials tended to have a more 
confrontational air about gender relations than did the earlier commentaries about 
the Rideout case. No author writing about the Rideout case suggested that the case 
was a sign of the "battle of the sexes" or would have an impact on "male-female" 
relations. Although some did mention that the Rideout's subsequent (brief) 
reconciliation might make some people less likely to support wife-rape legislation, 
none said it might lead to a "backlash against women's progress." While women 
continued to make progress in equality and establish themselves through the 1980s 
and 1990s (Rosen, 2000), the authors of the commentaries became more supportive 
of wife rape legislation. Simultaneously, however, the tone of the American culture 
shifted to one of confrontation and struggle between men and women (Faludi, 1991; 
Rosen, 2000). This shift in culture might have made an impression on public 
perception of the issues surrounding wife rape. 
Faludi (1991) contends in her book Backlash that there has been a backlash 
against feminism since the early 1980s. At the time the Bobbitt commentaries were 
written, Faludi's book was relatively new. It is possible that the Bobbitt 
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commentaries were written at a time when there was more contention between 
feminist ideals and those of the general public. Sex-role ideologies shift; Faludi's 
thesis that the 1980s and 1990s saw a decrease in support for women's rights may 
indeed represent a backlash of sorts. By the time of the Bobbitt trials, rape 
awareness was no longer a new issue, nor was the women's rights movement as 
organized or outspoken (Rosen, 2000). It is also possible that the violent nature of 
both of the Bobbitts' behavior led to more violent wording in the commentaries. 
Regardless, the widespread support for women's rights in general were more 
pronounced in the commentaries of the late 1970s and 1980s than in the Bobbitt 
commentaries of the 1990s. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, the commentaries in the three newspapers were supportive of 
legislation against wife rape, which is encouraging. By the 1980s, no commentary 
was openly opposed to the laws, and many of the 1970s commentaries were in favor 
of the laws as well. As with any new issue in the media agenda, there will be those 
who are ready to defend their position, promote or discourage change, and maintain 
the status quo. Concerning wife rape, commentary authors did so in a variety of 
ways, using humor, sarcasm, crime statistics, and quotations from various 
professionals and opinion leaders to get their viewpoints across. Beyond similarity 
in subject and terminologies used, the commentaries were quite divergent in how 
they approached the various issues associated with wife rape. 
Although some authors used several myths to fight wife-rape legislation, 
others combated the very same myths. The existence of cases in the 1990s, such as 
the Bobbitt case, and the 1996 case of Ramiro Espinosa, who declared he had a 
Biblical and constitutional right to have sex with his wife whenever he wanted, 
show that there are still people who hold to the sex-role ideologies that place men's 
needs above women's. The presence of commentaries that criticize these rapes is a 
sign that not everyone in the culture holds true to those ideologies. 
An important point about the commentaries, then, was not their support of 
sex-role ideologies, but their role in fighting them. Nineteen of the 32 commentaries 
were focused on their support for wife-rape legislation. The other 13 were a mixture 
of support and argument against the illegality of wife rape. In the 1970s, all of the 
commentary authors agreed that women, as a rule, should have complete autonomy 
over their bodies, and that they were in no way property of their husbands. Where 
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the authors argued that wife rape should be seen as a crime of assault instead of 
rape, they did not necessarily equate this with the notion that wives were less 
autonomous than non-married women. Some authors just insisted that assault 
would be easier to prosecute in a courtroom. While this argument diminishes the 
emotional and physical impact of wife rape, at least the authors of these 
commentaries did not subscribe to the outdated myth of the common law precedent 
of the wife's perpetual consent. 
All of the commentaries written by the newspapers' editorial staffs were 
strongly in favor of eliminating the marital exemption clause. The reasons for this 
are not clear, but perhaps the newspapers tended to be slightly more progressive 
about social change than the general public. Benedict (1992) noted that newspapers, 
especially in the 1970s, tended to write favorably about women's rights issues, even 
when the general public was still undecided about the benefits and acceptability of 
some of the women's rights movement's assertions and initiatives. 
Missing from the commentary pages was experience-based commentaries. 
Not a single survivor of wife rape wrote in to talk about her experience. Apart from 
Russell's study (1990), this is not atypical of the research field either. But if the goal 
is to prevent wife rape, direct commentaries or citations of those who have 
experienced it first hand or second hand (e.g., family or friends of a survivor), could 
lead to a better understanding that wife rape is a violent crime that often is about 
power much more than sex. The lack of survivor-authored commentaries or 
survivor attributions in the commentaries may be because, sensing that the public is 
yet to develop its sensitivity to wife rape trauma, survivors may rightly be hesitant 
to tell their stories. In addition, wife rape survivors may not be ready to classify 
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their experiences as wife rape (Russe11,1990), so they may not believe they have 
anything to write about. 
Perhaps the greatest disservice the commentaries committed is the framing of 
the issue as one of sexual intercourse (which may be related to survivors' hesitancy 
to label their experience as rape). It is obvious that any form of rape involves the act 
of sexual intercourse—that is what differentiates it from other forms of assault. 
However, to focus on wife rape as primarily about sexual intercourse instead of 
violent assault confounds persuasion and coercion. Persuasion is when a husband 
convinces a wife to have sex when she may not want to but is not opposed. This 
could happen in any marriage, but is not rape because the wife consents, even if it is 
without enthusiasm. Coercion is when a husband forces a wife to have sex when 
she does not give consent, even hesitantly. The commentaries may encourage the 
confusion by calling wife rape "compulsory sexual intercourse in marriage," and 
"intramarital sexual intercourse against the will of the wife" instead of "rape" or 
"wife rape." "Marital rape" or "spousal rape," while not portraying the direction of 
causality (who rapes whom), is preferable because it at the least reflects the 
seriousness of the crime and the notion of who is assaulting and being assaulted. 
The dearth of commentaries on the topic indicates that wife rape has never 
been high on the media agenda within the study's timekame, which helps explain 
why the public's opinion of the crime does not compare in severity to other forms of 
rape. If stranger rape had been more prominently covered and more generally 
denounced in the media than wife rape, the public will have had more opportunities 
to think about wife rape and its implications for victims. It has been 25 years since 
the first national news story on wife rape hit the newspaper pages, and in those 25 
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years, three of the largest major national newspapers have featured only 32 
commentaries on the subject, mostly linked to two trials that were, at best, confusing 
and flawed, and at worst, scandalous. The public could hardly empathize with 
either of the victims (Greta Rideout and Lorena Bobbitt), though they both deserved 
perhaps more than they received. Both were flawed individuals who married 
poorly. One reconciled with her accused rapist (though the reconciliation was only 
temporary, it was long enough for the public to blame and ridicule her). The other 
sliced off her husband's penis. In each case, more than one commentary stressed 
their character flaws and misdeeds. More commentaries about less scandalous cases 
or more general themes within wife rape cases may have allowed for a more 
thorough and balanced understanding of the issue. 
Final Thoughts 
Hoff Sommers (1994) argued that rape is not a crime based on gender because 
other more patriarchal societies have fewer rapes per 100,000 than the United States. 
If more patriarchal countries do have fewer rapes, it does not necessarily mean that 
rape is not a crime of gender. All it suggests is that there is a wider problem causing 
the significantly higher rape rates in this country. 
One potential explanation is the difference between patriarchy and sexism 
that Hoff Sommers overlooks. Patriarchy maybe seen as a concept, a collection of 
cultural norms, that promote traditional sex-role ideologies (e.g., women should not 
work outside the home, women are naturally inferior). Sexism is acting out on 
patriarchal norms (e.g., not hiring a woman because of her gender, treating women 
as weak and helpless). Sexism can be played out in anon-violent or violent way. In 
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many countries that are arguably more patriarchal than the United States, sexism 
may be predominantly acted upon in non-violent ways (e.g., not hiring a woman, 
not allowing them in certain places, making them wear certain clothing). In the 
United States, women are not prevented from working or entering anywhere they 
choose to go. They are allowed equal education opportunities, and equality is 
generally if not completely accepted as the norm in most public arenas. However, 
sexism in this country all too often is played out in very violent ways, including 
rape. 
The societal acceptance of the atrocity of rape will not end unless the~norms 
behind them are replaced with nonviolent, nonsexist alternatives. The fact that 
American society is generally accepting of women in the workplace, in education, 
and most other public arenas is hopeful. Many of these cultural changes have taken 
place in the last 40 years. Rape awareness has increased since the beginning of 
second-wave feminism in the early 1970s. This makes the general lack of awareness 
and abhorrence of wife rape in the culture as a whole all the more upsetting. If the 
media had an impact on the awareness of rape in general, the lack of coverage may 
equally slow the awareness of this particular crime in society. What is and is not 
available from the media, if not helping the plight of victims of wife rape, is hurfiing 
them. 
This discourse analysis of the history of wife rape in the newspaper 
commentaries attempted to examine whether that media genre has worked to 
develop and maintain the too often violent sex-role ideology that allows our 
equality-based culture to accept one of the highest rape crime rate in the world. The 
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findings indicate that it is not an easy determination to make. The commentary 
media perpetuate and contradict sex-role ideologies, both obviously and subtly. 
Based on this study to determine the content of newspaper commentaries on 
wife rape, further research could determine whether the commentary media help 
individuals maintain whichever view of wife rape that individual has. If a reader 
holds a traditional view of gender and marital roles, is s/he more likely to seek 
further proof of that opinion in the commentaries? On the contrary, if a reader holds 
less traditional views of gender and marriage, will s / he may be more likely to look 
for reinforcement in the commentaries that focus on pro-legislation views? More 
than maintaining sex-role ideologies, perhaps future research could determine 
whether commentaries may maintain whatever the reader wants to believe. 
In addition, further research could examine regional newspapers to 
determine whether newspapers in different parts of the country publish 
commentaries with similar or different themes. Were there more editorials 
published regionally about each state's elimination of the marital exemption than 
about trials such as the Rideout or Bobbitt trials? International media coverage of 
the same questions could also be an informative project that would shed light not 
only on how other countries might view wife rape but also how those perceptions 
compare to the United States. These questions could shed additional light on how 
commentaries discuss the issue of wife rape and sex-role ideology. 
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